TFC's Tactical Autopsy Thread

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This Bayern game was pretty much perfect for highlighting many of the issues that are wrong right now. You could run it as a power point demo to cover many of the bases.

We are a team that is structurally poor, tactically confused, lethargic in our application. We have a manager who continues to pick players that don't suit his structure and tactics and whose naivety has often been shown up on the big occasions, in the last 12 months has been shown up by much humbler opponents.

This is not a simple problem of one player or one position or one area of the pitch.

The first 30 minutes were pretty good. We came out all bright eyed and bushy tailed, we were pressing as a team pretty well, Winks was busying about, Ndombele was threading wonderful defence splitting passes, and even Sissoko looked vaguely like a footballer. The fact that they started in a 4231 helped too, as our 1+2 CM3, when it was in this early energy phase, could outnumber them.

But then it quickly fell apart, after 30 minutes we were fucking spent, people stopped pressing, stood off, stopped offering themselves up for the ball, as a result the shape started to get more exposed - particularly the right back zone - as the forward payers just fucking ambled about, and the spanking that many of us had said would happen if we pulled this shit against a "top" side finally materialised.

People are constantly latching onto to things like the fact that we don't have a proper DM or our RB isn't great (although we were assured by many that it was all Trippier's fault). Things don't go as progressively badly wrong as they have been going for the last 2 years because of just one or two personnel issues. City lost Fernandinho and their LB at times last couple of years, but they didn't just fucking melt into being shit everywhere. Bayern scored 5 goals playing without a pure DM and a pretty shit RB playing at LB in the second half. Because they at least have the fundamental basics endemically ingrained.

DM

Winks isn't always ideal in that 6/Hub role, but it's not that simple, it is compounded by having Sissoko out there as the 6/8 partner in a CM2, or as the 8 in the CM3, who doesn't want to show for the ball when we need outlets under pressure, and is generally so fucking slow at reading and reacting without out the ball. And now we have Ndombele out there too, with the ball he's excellent, without the ball he's got learning to do, also not the most defensively dynamic, and needs to be more proactive looking for it when we are playing out.

A perfect example (and I've posted stuff like this before as has RESPECT THE COCK RESPECT THE COCK demonstrating this) is the third goal. Winks makes the initial mistake of passing the ball back to Rose when he actually has time to turn. What happens then is that Sissoko sees what is happening but actively refuses to show for the ball, move toward Rose or move into a position where he can offer Rose or Winks an option, so Rose has no other option but to give it back to Winks (who is the only one prepared to offer himself up) who now has absolutely no options at all because Sissoko still hasn't read or moved into a position to receive the ball:

First mistake - Winks goes backwards instead of forwards:
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Winks move to receive the ball, Sissoko just stands there and fucking points (at fuck all as ever) so even when Rose does pass the ball to Winks, Sissoko doesn't even make himself available for the next phase - he just assumes it will "work itself out" if he points enough:
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Now Winks has the ball, but with no options as Sissoko has made no effort to offer himself:
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Result, Winks is pressed out of possession, and they score. Everyone blames Winks entirely, but he was just part of the clusterfuck, but the real problem is players like Winks not having options on the ball because others are fucking lazy or hiding, and that's become endemic at times in this midfield, and when your midfield isn't functioning, it's like a car with a fucked engine.

And Ndombele was just as guilty. He has to get more proactive in seeking out the ball in a team that wants to move the ball from front to back, and he's also got to get more diligent defensively. The thing with Sissoko is, he doesn't offer what Ndombele offers on the ball either.

So yes, Winks is definitely not ideal, I would dearly have loved us to buy a proper 6 in the last two windows, and I really don't think he's the future in this remit, but we also need to get the whole midfield balance right. We need three proper footballers in there, a good footballing busy cunting 6, with hopefully a developing Ndombele and scheming, more dynamic Lo Celso either side, rendering Winks a squad option.

RB

Another area of constant apoplexy. I said for the last two years that the issue is not Trippier per se. He wasn't perfect, definitely had some deficiencies, but the problem was clearly Poch's structure, tactical application and selections that were counter intuitive to the system he was insisting our FB's play.

Its being exposed even more now because Aurier doesn't have Trippier's brain or even Walker's recovery pace, which could compensate sometimes. Aurier does stupid things, and when Gnabry raced away for the third, he should not have dived in (just as he shouldn't have tugged Bertrand), he should have stayed on his feet and tried to catch him or put pressure on him - as Gnabry would eventually be a bit slower because he had to dribble with the ball and cut in - but the situation arose because Kane and Alli just fucking stood there and watched as the Bayern defenders knocked it around, then out to the LB.

If you are going to play the high line and push FB's up, then pressing up top is absolutely fucking fundamental. Or put a structure in place that compensates, preferably both. Otherwise you pull the CM's up and out of shape to press where the forwards should be and that leaves massive spaces, vertically and laterally for opponent AM's and forwards to get into - See the Newcastle goal.

You cannot play a high defensive line, ask your RB to push right up with your midfield and beyond and then not pressure the opposition on the ball - it will continually expose that full back zone.

So yes, Aurier is not the brightest, he's not ideal, but as we have seen, it doesn't matter who we play there, if Poch doesn't fucking wise up and get the structure and tactics right, the RB will continue to be exposed and bare the brunt of Poch's tactics.

SELECTIONS

You cannot keep picking players that are counter intuitive to the way you want to play as a collective. If you want to play out from the back and play through the opponent press - which more and more are doing now - you cannot have big dumb units that are uncomfortable under that press and lack the brains, 360 vision or technique to deal with it. This was true 3 years ago with Dier and it's even truer with Sissoko now. These players are also invariably spent after 30 minutes and just spend the rest of the game ambling about standing off, or in Dier's case retreating back int the CB's shorts.

Moura as a fucking CF. Offers absolutely nothing to team play in this role and just gets in Kane's way. Head down, scurry scurry then fuck all. CB's as fucking RB's. Alli bumbling about as the lone creative hub. CM2's against 433's. CM2’s like Winks/Sissoko that cannot play out and also aren’t defensively diligent enough to protect the cb’s whilst also covering advanced fb’s. The fucking wanky diamond. The wanky 442 when the wanky diamond fucks up. Stupid subs that make us worse not better.


FORMAT

Once again we got the fucking diamond. Poch won't let it go will he, no matter how many times it fucks us up the arse. Just play a fucking 433 for fuck sake.

With the midfielders we have it's absolutely vital we play a a CM3 system to compensate for the various deficiencies they all have. And they need three ahead of them spread out more laterally to occupy opponents defenders and FB's, and they all need to start working cohesively without the ball as a group.

You've got Kane who is the ideal central fulcrum and players like Son, Lamela, Moura (Sessegnon to come in too) who would be much better as wide forwards, and would allow us to press in a better shape and help protect the FB areas. We could use Alli as a false 9 sometimes, or occasionally as an 8 if Ndombele, Lo Celso or Eriksen aren't available. But lets stop pretending he's composed enough to be a lone 10, the only season he looked good enough was when we played the 3421 and he had Eriksen up there next to him doing his thing.


APPLICATION

A lot has been written about our press, or lack thereof. We don't necessarily have to press like nutters for 90 minutes, in fact that's completely unrealistic, Klopp worked this out pretty quickly. But we need to start doing it again, and in a cohesive manner, game phases need to be managed so much better. Whether we are pressing high or alternating phases, those phases need to be coordinated, and it's never acceptable to just allow the opposition phases where no pressure is applied at all and the shape just drifts about like a fart in the fucking wind.

But again, Poch needs to start picking the right format and more importantly the right personnel to facilitate this. Big lumbering units that chug about, blowing hard after every sprint are counter productive. Stupid players, that struggle to read and coordinate offensive and defensive transitions are counter productive.

Poch has signed stupid athletes, has been asking them to do complicated things, and then bitches about a lack of intensity and intelligence.

CLUB

The biggest mistake Levy made was to make Poch the de facto "Manager" three years ago. I understand why it happened, at the time Poch's stock was top of the hip parade, everyone wanted him, to pacify him Levy gave him a mega pay rise and even more control over transfer strategy (maybe Poch was advised this was the way to go by his idol SAF) - this has backfired horribly. We've seen money wasted on dimwit athletes, we've seen contracts of pivotal players run down, we've seen favouritism and the dressing room leaders pandered to, whilst the academy has become almost an afterthought for the summer holiday tournaments and the odd away day in the Micky mouse cup.

More than anything, we need to revamp the whole structure of the club. We need to get a good DOF/Sporting Director in, get in a really good recruitment/analytics/scouting team. It's not all about spending big, it's about spending smart and making best use of resources on tap.

The player that put four past us last night cost Bayern 8m.
 
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We played our best football in recent years with a 4-2-3-1, pressing high (and from the front) and overwhelming teams. From that “era” (it’s been a couple of years lol), only two main players from that have left, Walker and Dembele. I don’t understand why we suddenly starting pissing around with this cunting diamond. It does not work.
 
Let's look at the goals conceded this season so far:

1- Aston Villa - McGinn -ball over the top from deep in their half. Didn't track runner

2 - Man City - Sterling, cross from relatively deep, nipped in back post

3- Man City - Aguero - cross from byline, tap in

4 - Newcastle - Joelinton - cross from relatively deep, caught flat footed

5 - Woolwich - Lacazette defensive error Winks, tried passing out got caught

6 - Woolwich - Aubemayang - cross from relatively deep, caught around the back

7 - Olympiakos - Podensa - give and go down our left, flat footed Davies lost his man

8- Olympiakos - Valbuena Pen - defensive error Eriksen, passing out from back & got caught, Vertonghen lunged in and gave away cheap penalty.

9- Leicester - Ricardo - Ball lost via Sissoko. Aurier didn't track back, cross and tap in

10 - Leicester - Maddison - ball lost by Wanyama, long range effort Maddison

11 - Southampton - Ings - pass back and calamity by Lloris

12 - Bayern - Kimmich, Rose didn't track back but it was a good goal, no complaints

13- Bayern - Lewandowski - Ndombele should have cleared didn't, lost possession

14- Bayern - Gnabry - Aurier lunged in, missed his tackle nd left Gnabry vs Toby

15- Bayern- Gnabry - Winks loses possession in dangerous are, punished instantly

16- Bayern - Gnabry - ball over the top, Aurier didn't track back, great finish 1v1

17- Bayern - Lewandowski - Alderweireld poor pass out from back, easy goal

18- Bayern - Gnabry - Aurier poor pass out from back, easy goal


18 goals conceded. 2 from deep balls over the top from their defence, 3 from relatively deep crosses from the wing around the back of our defence, 2 byline tap ins, 8 (EIGHT!!) conceded trying to pass out from the back (9 if you include Lloris's error against the Saints) and a few through Aurier and Rose not tracking their runners.

Our issues are defensive. We have lost possession in our own half, leading to goals scored 9 times in 9 games. Add to that the 2 long balls from deep (McGinn & Gnabry) as well as the relatively deep crosses that have led to similar goals against Sterling, Joelinton and Aubemayang and that simp,y isn't good enough.

Nine times we've been caught short trying to pas out from the back this season alone! (Lacazette, Valbuena penalty, Ricardo, Maddison, Ings, Lewandowski, Gnabry, Lewandowski, Gnabry). We are haemorrhaging goals with purely lax and casual mindsets. 3-4 of those goals given up were on the edge of our box (Lacazette, Valbuena pen, Lewandowski 1st goal) all came from dangerous moments when we had won possession back, only to choose to pass out instead of clear our lines.

The breakdown of our goals conceded leaves me feeling that we need to get back to basics and just clear our lines. Do that and switch on more when it comes to deep crosses (we've conceded 5 from balls played into our box from further than 25 yards out of goal) and we will steady the ship.

The amount of errors we make are what holds us back. They need to respect the opposition more!

NINE mistakes passing out at the back, TWO long range passes from defence, THREE mid deep crosses around the back and FOUR through fullbacks not tracking their runner. Shocking!

On THREE occasions we have conceded in the 45th minute this season, an drew on THREE occasions we have conceded within 10 minutes of the 2nd half starting. Brain farts all over the joint,we need to snap out of it!!!
 
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All I hear is that Jose set us up to lose and that we shouldn't be so hard on player X because Jose insists on playing them out of position.

If you were Jose and walked in today, what would you do different? This isn't a rhetorical question. I'm curious.

So many things.

Just tonight for example. He set up away from him 2with lo celso and winks in midfield. No power , no natural tackler, no ball winner. Then rather than a 343 it's a 523. You can see it if you go back and watch. Their players are lining up on the edge of the box over and over again as we basically had no midfield. Its amazing he never changed it.

The striker situation. If I have players that aren't strikers trying to do a job the first thing id do is get lots of support around them and as best as possible play to their strengths. What does jose do? Isolate them and hoof long balls up. They have no chance.

So if I were jose I'd pack the midfield, play a high line so drop toby and play dav and tanganga which would enable us to play high up the pitch even if those two aren't perfect. I'd also get bodies in and around the forwards so they are never isolated and encourage them to express themselves and open up opportunities for each other

I'd also stop saying negative shit about the team and be a leader. So stop acting like we have no chance. Give the players confidence.
 
2019-20 Season Poch v Mou - in metrics

So, bored already with the winter break, I thought I'd have a quick look at some of the X/G metrics and possession stats, to get a quick snapshot of how some of the basics have changed (or not) since Mourinho took over.

Under Pochettino in the first 12 games this season we averaged 55.74% possession.

Under Mourinho in the last 13 games we have averaged 49.35% possession.


Our XG (Expected goals) under Poch was 1.16 per game

Our XG under Mourinho is 1.45 per game


Our XGA (Expected Goals against) under Poch was 1.42

Our XGA under Mourinho is 1.36


Our PPG (points per game) under Poch 1.17

our PPG under Mourinho 1.77


So....

Our possession is down about 12%.

The big surprise really is that Mourinho hasn't really improved our Expected goals against (XGA) much per game, improving by a marginal 6%.

He has improved our Expected Goals (XG) per game, but not by loads, by about 25%.

The biggest gain is in our Points Per Game which has gone up by a pretty healthy 38%, but even that isn't spunktatsic, as if we averaged that out over the course of a season, we'd finish around 6th.



IF YOU FIND ANY OF THIS INFORMATIVE, please take the time to get over to the Off topic section and vote for an "INFORMATIVE" rating to be in introduced - then next time I do this, if things have gone to fucking pish, you can "INFORMATIVE" it instead of feeling uncomfortable about "LIKING" it.
 
This article was based on the Everton game, but it goes into detail and highlights how this has been a theme under Mourinho, it puts some detail on why we were so poor against Everton, which carried on, in many ways against Southampton. Our inability to press teams properly. Not just actually trundling around looking like pressing, but doing it properly, cohesively. We attempted half the pressures against Southampton (118) than we did Everton (220) and were successful (regaining possession 5 seconds from pressing event) about the same percentage (Eve 19.5% Sot 23%). I spoke in the Southampton thread about the folly of the first half tactical clusterfuck of playing a high line, with our RB pushed up, whilst not pressuring the ball, and Southampton scored like this and got into us several times. It was just a miracle that Kane and Son did something unique to the PL history that day.



Was Spurs’ pressure lazy? Yes, but that’s not their pressing problem – this is

“I’m disappointed with my team.”

There are few things worse for a manager to say after an opening game of a new season, but that’s exactly what Jose Mourinho told reporters after his side’s defeat by Everton on Sunday.

Spurs lost 1-0, and were outshot (15 to nine) and out xG’d (1.2 to 1.13) in the process. On paper, that says they were slightly unfortunate to come away from the game without any points, given Everton didn’t batter them in terms of the quality of chances that they created.

Matt Doherty had his now-characteristic big chance of the match after floating in from the right, and Dele Alli also had a great opportunity to score (worth 0.36 xG, Spurs’ best chance of the game), although that was arguably a bad outcome, and one reflective of new-season rustiness, given Spurs created this…

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…from this…

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Nevertheless, this is a team who have top-six aspirations and should be either creating far better chances or limiting those of their opposition.

The main source of Mourinho’s disappointment (despite the result) was how his side attempted to press Everton. “Lazy pressure” was what he labelled his side’s attempts to close down their opponent, especially when Everton were passing out from the back.

So, was Spurs’ pressure lazy?

PPDA, or passes allowed per opponent defensive action, is one such proxy to try and capture the degree to which an opponent is pressuring the opposition. For those unfamiliar, the stat looks to count the number of times that a team attempts a defensive action, such as a tackle or interception, compared to the number of times the opposition attempts a pass.

A low PPDA number indicates higher intensity when trying to win the ball back and a higher figure indicates a team that is more passive without the ball.

Spurs’ PPDA for the game against Everton sat at 11.9, lower than Mourinho’s average of 12.4 since joining last November and slightly lower than the league average too. All models are wrong but some are useful, as the saying goes, and that’s definitely the case here. PPDA tells us that Tottenham tried to press, but it doesn’t give us any indication of the successful execution of that strategy — or the degree of laziness, if we’re talking in Mourinho’s language.


Another perspective is required, one that attempts to understand the quality of a press, not the mere presence of it.

One means of understanding this is to consider how many times a team pressures the ball, and how often that leads to a turnover of possession. Statsbomb pressure data via fbref calculates exactly this and can help to evaluate the quality of a press. Again, no model is perfect, but it’s a good enough proxy.

Spurs pressured Everton 220 times and, of those, won possession of the ball back just 43 times within five seconds. As a percentage, that indicates Tottenham’s pressure was successful 19.5 per cent of the time, the lowest figure in the Premier League so far this season, just a touch below Fulham (19.6 per cent).

Spurs were applying pressure, but it wasn’t leading to turnovers, and also failing to stop Everton from getting into the final third or progressing through to the middle of the field. Lazy pressure indeed.

So does the blame automatically go to the players though? Well, not entirely.

Pressing isn’t a binary tactic. You don’t decide as a manager that you want your team to press, and it suddenly is a successful means of approaching the game when out of possession.

Pressing can be co-ordinated and deadly if employed correctly, something with which Spurs fans are only too familiar, given they were one of the best pressing sides in the league during the early years of Mauricio Pochettino’s reign at the club.

Mourinho succinctly summed up the impact of a bad press to Sky Sports after the game, saying “when you have lazy pressure, you don’t press, you allow opponents to build from the back. Lazy pressure up front creates unbalanced situations for the rest of the team”.

The key part of that first quote is how lazy pressure means you don’t press. That’s an important delineation to bear in mind. Pressure comes from one player, a press is the co-ordination of multiple pressures simultaneously or sequentially.

Think of a time when you’ve played football and you’ve chased down the player on the ball, only for them to fully alleviate all the pressure you applied by making a simple sideways pass to a free team-mate. That was good pressurefrom you (give yourself a pat on the back) but bad pressing (give your team-mates the hairdryer after the match).

The knowledge of when and where to press in a game to form an effective press has to come from training, and that’s on the coaching staff.

Going back to the numbers, Tottenham’s 220 pressures was the most in the Premier League this weekend, and the third-highest in a game under Mourinho. That’s ammunition to suggest that the level of effort was there from the players, but the co-ordination of the press wasn’t.

Here’s one such example of that lack of co-ordination. Everton start with a goal kick in the fourth minute of the game, and Jordan Pickford elects to play it short. Yerry Mina receives the ball from Pickford, which triggers Alli to pressure the Colombian…

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…but given the lengths Alli has to go to, Mina has time to coolly play it square to Michael Keane, who is under no pressure from Harry Kane. Kane jogs in Lucas Digne’s general direction with little conviction, and Keane passes the ball out to him.

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Lucas Moura is triggered to start pressuring Digne when the Frenchman receives the ball. Digne is still able to get the ball down the line with relative ease. While he makes the pass, Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg sprints to close down Andre Gomes, leaving a big gap behind him.

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Richarlison receives the ball and is under intense pressure from Doherty. A heavy touch should be pounced on by Spurs, but the ball pops back to Digne…

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…who gets a pass off to Abdoulaye Doucoure ahead of Hojbjerg…

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…who knocks it back to Gomes despite being under pressure from Harry Winks…

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…who sprays it out wide to Seamus Coleman.

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From there, Everton manage to get the ball into the box, but a Richarlison air-shot ends the sequence of play. Below is an overhead view of how that sequence unfolded.

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There’s another example again in the 28th minute. Jordan Pickford receives the ball and is being closed down by Kane.

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Kane’s pressure is fairly poor, however, and Pickford is easily able to step past him and slot the ball through to Gomes in midfield, with Allan moving to the right side of the pitch to make space for Gomes in behind. Hojbjerg again is very aggressive in his movement, following Allan without thinking of what’s happening behind him.

Again, Spurs’ structure in this situation is pretty poor. Kane’s pressing was lazy here, yes, but there’s no player on the left side of the field to close down Gomes or stop Keane — who is stood behind Kane inside the box — from being an easy passing option.

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Again, this move progresses upfield fairly quickly from here, reaching the penalty area, as you can see from the pass map below.

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These examples point to a clear lack of principles: the when and where aren’t clear, and all of the effort that’s required to turn pressure into pressing is wasted.

There’s also a clear thread in both examples of Hojbjerg’s high-energy approach, which provides a wonderful example of why sprint distance and speed without context is useless. The Dane may need some time to unlearn the high-octane pressing style that he was a part of at Southampton.

Is this a case of paralysis by analysis, and we’re zooming in too much on a single game? Again, the data shows perhaps not. Here’s that successful pressure metric again, for each of Spurs’ games since the start of last season.

There was a clear fluctuation in the effectiveness of the pressing for Spurs under Pochettino and Mourinho before the COVID-19-enforced lockdown. Since the restart, there’s a clear downward trend on Spurs’ inability to apply pressure effectively.

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It’s tough to predict which direction this will go in next, but for now, it seems clear that Spurs’ pressing, while present, isn’t all that effective. There are structural issues that need addressing.

So how do Spurs and Mourinho go about mending the press?

One such solution is to forget the press entirely and elect instead to clog the midfield and block the passing lanes that lead to easy ball progression. Spurs have great counter-attacking options and can use the energy they’re preserving from not applying pressure to break from deep instead.

This could either be a longer-term strategy — and that may well be the best option, given Mourinho hasn’t had overly effective pressing sides in the past — or just one to use until the squad is back to match fitness.

The alternative solution would be to use training to better teach the players about the triggers of when and where to apply pressure, turning Tottenham’s individual efforts to win the ball back into a more cohesive, mechanistic method when out of possession. History tells us that this is a big ask: Mourinho’s teams haven’t ever really been lauded for their high-pressing approach, especially not in a way that is comparable to effective high-pressing teams in the modern game.

Mourinho’s attempt to employ a pressing strategy after the shortest (and weirdest) pre-season ever does feel somewhat short-sighted, and also part of a recent trend in Spurs’ inability to turn pressure into pressing.

Of course, Tottenham’s season doesn’t hinge on one game, but how the side bounces back after an opening-day defeat, and either looks to fix or abandon the press, is one of the main themes to pay attention to in their next few games.
 
So, fwiw, here's a Manchester Evening News (MEN) piece about our 6-1 demolition of manure, which claims to be based on information from "Spurs insiders".

The reporter, Samuel Luckhurst, is the MEN's lead manure correspondent, and held this role whilst Mourinho was their coach. So, there may well be an extant channel from that time. I don't claim to have any knowledge on this, and since I certainly haven't followed the MEN's coverage closely, it may also be that Mourinho got the hump with them during his tenure. The piece does feel as if it could have been based on an off the record briefing from Mourinho with the explicit purpose of underlining some of his criticisms and concerns about the manure squad he managed.

The key claim is that Aurier & Regui played high because Mourinho knew Rashford & Greenwood would not provide cover, and this would expose Wan-Bissaka and Shaw, forcing Maguire & Bailly to leave their core CB positions. Our attacking players, like Sonny & Kane, could then exploit the space in manure's box.

The other central claim is that Mourinho judged "Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed". This is particularly interesting, because Ole's core midfield is presumably Bruno Fernandes as the AM, Pogba behind him, with a DM (Matic or Fred or McTominay).

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Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
Man United were humiliated 6-1 by Tottenham and part of Jose Mourinho's gameplan was to capitalise on United's lack of protection at full-back.
Tottenham exploited the defensive shortcomings of Marcus Rashford and Mason Greenwood in their 6-1 thrashing of Manchester United.
The MEN understands Tottenham full-backs Serge Aurier and Sergio Reguilon were tasked with pressing high as their counterparts Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Luke Shaw were not protected by Greenwood or Rashford.
Spurs insiders felt Aurier and Reguilon 'killed' United 'because Greenwood and Rashford don't defend' and Aurier scored Spurs's fifth early in the second-half.
Two of Tottenham's goals came down Shaw's side and Mourinho pinpointed Shaw's tendency to abandon his station as a pundit at Old Trafford in August last year.
"Chelsea moves the ball well but they don’t look for an overlap a lot," Mourinho said during the interval of United's 4-0 victory over Chelsea. "When they do, Maguire is the one that has to jump on the outside as United’s midfield players are not defending in the box.
"When Maguire has to cover for Luke Shaw - he will learn he has to do this a lot of times during the season - the space in the face of the ball, somebody has to arrive."
Tottenham staff are also believed to have correctly guessed United's starting XI - including the inclusion of Eric Bailly at the expense of Victor Lindelof. United's coaching staff were unsure whether Son Heung-min would figure for Tottenham until they discovered he had travelled to Manchester on Saturday night.
Spurs settled on a high press to disrupt United's subdued midfielders Paul Pogba and Nemanja Matic, who was substituted at half-time with United 4-1 down. Tottenham are believed to have viewed Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed.
Matic returned late to pre-season training and Pogba arrived three days later as he tested positive for COViD-19 in August. Pogba has started all three of United's Premier League matches and looked lethargic.


Exclusive: Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
 
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Jürgen Klopp was in his third week as Liverpool’s manager, in November 2015, when the team’s director of research, Ian Graham, arrived at his office carrying computer printouts. Graham wanted to show Klopp, whom he hadn’t yet met, what his work could do. Then he hoped to persuade Klopp to actually use it.
Graham spread out his papers on the table in front of him. He began talking about a game that Borussia Dortmund, the German club that Klopp coached before joining Liverpool, had played the previous season. He noted that Dortmund had numerous chances against the lightly regarded Mainz, a smaller club that would end up finishing in 11th place. Yet Klopp’s team lost, 2-0. Graham was starting to explain what his printouts showed when Klopp’s face lit up. “Ah, you saw that game,” he said. “It was crazy. We killed them. You saw it!”
Graham had not seen the game. But earlier that fall, as Liverpool was deciding who should replace the manager it was about to fire, Graham fed a numerical rendering of every attempted pass, shot and tackle by Dortmund’s players during Klopp’s tenure into a mathematical model he had constructed. Then he evaluated each of Dortmund’s games based on how his calculations assessed the players’ performances that day. The difference was striking. Dortmund had finished seventh during Klopp’s last season at the club, but the model determined that it should have finished second. Graham’s conclusion was that the disappointing season had nothing to do with Klopp, though his reputation had suffered because of it. He just happened to be coaching one of the unluckiest teams in recent history.
In that game against Mainz, the charts showed, Dortmund took 19 shots compared with 10 by its opponent. It controlled play nearly two-thirds of the time. It advanced the ball into the offensive zone a total of 85 times, allowing Mainz to do the same just 55 times. It worked the ball into Mainz’s penalty area on an impressive 36 occasions; Mainz managed only 17. But Dortmund lost because of two fluky errors. In the 70th minute, Dortmund missed a penalty shot. Four minutes later, it mistakenly scored in its own goal. Dortmund had played a better game than Mainz by almost any measure — except the score.

In soccer, pure chance can influence outcomes to a much greater extent than in other sports. Goals are relatively rare, fewer than three per game in England’s Premier League. So whether a ball ricochets into the net or misses it by a few inches has, on average, far more of an effect upon the final result than whether, say, a potential home run in baseball lands fair or foul or an N.F.L. running back grinds out a first down. Graham brought up another game to Klopp, against Hannover a month later. The statistics were weighted even more heavily in Dortmund’s favor: 18 shots to seven, 55 balls into the box compared with 13, 11 successful crosses from the wing to three. “You lost, 1-0,” he said. “But you created double the chances —”

Klopp practically shouted. “Did you see that game?”
“No, no, it’s just ...”
“We killed them! I’ve never seen anything like it. We should have won. Ah, you saw that!”
Graham had not seen that game, either. In fact, he told Klopp, he hadn’t seen any of Dortmund’s games that season, neither live nor on video. He hadn’t needed to, unless he wanted to experience one of the breathtaking acts of athleticism that can occur in soccer, or the drama of two teams fighting to assert their will upon the other — the reasons, in other words, that most fans watch sports. To understand what happened, all he needed was his data.
Analytics has famously influenced the tactics in professional baseball and basketball in recent years. Ultimately, it may have just as great an impact on soccer, which traditionally hasn’t relied on statistics to figure out much of anything. Graham, who earned a doctorate in theoretical physics at Cambridge, built his own database to track the progress of more than 100,000 players from around the world. By recommending which of them Liverpool should try to acquire, and then how the new arrivals should be used, he has helped the club, once soccer’s most glamorous and successful, return to the cusp of glory.


Two Sundays ago, Liverpool concluded a regular season as compelling as any in the sport’s history. It lost only one of its 38 games in the Premier League, yet it finished second. Manchester City, the defending champion, edged Liverpool by a single point on the last day after winning every one of its league games since January. (In the Premier League, as elsewhere in soccer, a victory counts as three points in the standings and a draw counts as one; Liverpool set the record for the most points in a season, 97, by a runner-up.) In an added fillip for North American fans, Liverpool is owned by the same group of American businessmen who own baseball’s Boston Red Sox, last year’s World Series winners, while Manchester City has a business relationship with the New York Yankees.
At the same time as it was trying to stay ahead of Manchester City, in England, Liverpool was competing against the top teams from other countries in Europe’s Champions League. In the semifinals of that tournament this month, it overcame a three-goal deficit to defeat Barcelona, perhaps this era’s best soccer team. On June 1, it will face a Premier League opponent, Tottenham Hotspur, in the final.
More than other major clubs, Liverpool incorporates data analysis into the decisions it makes, from the corporate to the tactical. How much that has contributed to its recent performance is itself hard to measure. But whatever the outcome of the final, the club’s ascent has already started to make number-crunching acceptable, even fashionable, in England and beyond. As more clubs contemplate employing analysts without soccer-playing backgrounds to try to gain a competitive edge, Liverpool’s season has served as something of a referendum on the practice.

Klopp analyzed no data at Dortmund. In this, he was like most managers. He was consumed by coaching his young team on the field. But by the time Graham left his office that morning in 2015, Klopp’s epiphany was complete. He was convinced that Graham, despite having watched none of Dortmund’s games, appreciated the unusually bad fortune that had befallen the team almost as keenly as if he’d been coaching it himself. Later, Klopp learned that without Graham’s analysis of that season, which was only one aspect of as thorough an investigative process as any soccer club had undertaken to replace a manager, he never would have been hired. “The department there in the back of the building?” he said recently, referring to Graham and his staff. “They’re the reason I’m here.”
In the 79th minute of the second game of the Champions League semifinal, in early May, a ball was deflected out of bounds for a Liverpool corner kick. Trent Alexander-Arnold, a 20-year-old fullback, was about to move toward the middle of the field to let a Liverpool teammate take it. But as he started to walk away, Alexander-Arnold noticed that Barcelona’s players seemed distracted. Only a few were looking his way. “It was just one of those moments,” he said, “when you see the opportunity.” Alexander-Arnold took four steps, a feint as if heading back to his position. Suddenly he reversed direction, ran to the ball and thumped it toward Barcelona’s penalty area.
By then, Liverpool had already staged an improbable comeback to get the semifinal contest back on even terms. The team scored three unanswered goals, matching the three that Barcelona scored at home in the first game of the home-and-away series. Before the series started, Barcelona were the strong favorite to advance to the final, and the outcome of the first game validated that assessment. After that, someone who wanted to win $100 betting on Barcelona needed to risk $1,800 to do it.

For nearly a generation, between 1975 and 1990, Liverpool was dominant. It won 10 titles in England’s top division. It won the European Cup, which preceded the Champions League, four times in eight years. Liverpool F.C. was so successful that for a time it figured as one of England’s most visible exports. Fan clubs were organized throughout Europe, and in places that hadn’t previously followed the sport, such as Australia and across America.
English clubs in those days were owned by ruddy-faced businessmen who had kicked the ball around as boys and made fortunes with stone quarries or parking lots. That changed when the richest men in the world began buying them up. In 1997, the Egyptian businessman and department store owner Mohamed al-Fayed took control of Fulham, a London team in the second division, and led its promotion into the Premier League; in 2003, the Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who had made his fortune in oil, aluminum and steel, bought Chelsea; in 2007, Stan Kroenke, the husband of a Wal-Mart heir, began accumulating shares of Woolwich. That same year, the family that had controlled Liverpool for half a century sold out to two American businessmen, Tom Hicks and George Gillett. Hicks owned baseball’s Texas Rangers and hockey’s Dallas Stars; Gillett parlayed an interest in ski resorts into a Nascar team and the N.H.L.’s Montreal Canadiens. Liverpool itself remained a faded port of half a million inhabitants, only marginally less dilapidated than the gritty, gray-toned, postwar city that had produced the Beatles. Its dockside economy attracted far fewer major corporations than London or even Manchester. And it turned out that Gillett and Hicks had little money left for soccer. Within a few years, Liverpool was hundreds of millions of dollars in debt and struggling on the field.

In October 2010, through what was essentially a bankruptcy proceeding, Hicks and Gillett were forced to accept a $480 million bid from New England Sports Ventures. John Henry, the former commodities trader and investment manager who served as the majority shareholder, grew up in small-town Missouri and Arkansas. One of his boyhood passions was A.P.B.A. baseball, a dice game in which the actual performances of major leaguers are translated into cards representing each player; Stan Musial was as likely to hit a triple on Henry’s bedroom floor as he was for the St. Louis Cardinals in Sportsman’s Park. Henry became wealthy from an algorithm he devised that predicted fluctuations in the soybean market. The same sort of analysis is knit into his company’s DNA. Almost no decision there, from hiring executives to where the Red Sox shortstop should play for each batter, is made without it.

At the time that Henry’s group, now known as Fenway Sports Group, acquired Liverpool, the club hadn’t finished atop its league in two decades. Since Fenway couldn’t outspend sheikhs and oligarchs, it needed to be smart. In its first six seasons under Fenway’s ownership, Liverpool finished above sixth place only once. It qualified for the Champions League only one of those years, and was eliminated before the quarterfinals. Its reliance on numbers, many soccer people believed, was undermining the football men who should have been making its decisions. The main obstacle Klopp would need to overcome if he hoped to succeed at Liverpool, the English newspaper The Independent wrote, “will be the club’s deep attachment to the theory that players’ statistics — analytics — can provide most of the answers.”
But Graham’s analytics team can only nudge the team’s outcomes in a positive direction incrementally, one recommendation at a time. And because Klopp also gets advice from more conventional sources, the tactics he chooses end up being a mix of the data-driven and the intuitive. In preparation for the Champions League semifinal, he appeared to focus on how the club’s unusually quick defenders could pressure Barcelona’s forwards, intercepting passes and trying to convert them into instant counterattacks. The plan worked, mostly. In the opening minutes of the first game, Barcelona’s players seemed flustered. But as often happens in soccer, a tactical advantage didn’t translate into an immediate goal. Instead, Luis Suarez, a former Liverpool player, scored for Barcelona.
A 1-0 Liverpool loss would have set up a dramatic second game at Anfield, the atmospheric stadium that has been the club’s home since the 19th century. But late in the match, Barcelona’s Lionel Messi, one of soccer’s greats, scored twice more. The last goal was a free kick that curled around a wall of defenders and just past the outstretched hand of Liverpool’s goalkeeper. It seemed to impart the message that no amount of analytical preparation could overcome the transcendent skill of such a player. “In these moments,” Klopp said after the game, “he is unstoppable.”

In the Champions League, goals scored away from home carry additional weight if the score is tied after both games. That meant if Barcelona scored one goal at Anfield, Liverpool would need five to move on. If that wasn’t daunting enough, two of Liverpool’s best players, Mohamed Salah and Roberto Firmino, were hurt and wouldn’t play. Still, when Divock Origi, the substitute for Salah, scored in the game’s seventh minute, the crowd came alive. Then Liverpool scored two more times early in the second half. That set up Alexander-Arnold’s deceptive corner.
Before taking the kick, he caught Origi’s eye. Then, as Alexander-Arnold raced back to the corner, Origi switched his position. The ball reached him on two hops, and he redirected it into the left side of the net. It was a goal that could never have been scripted, or predicted by any calculations. “We had nothing to do with the fourth goal,” Graham emailed me after the game. “I’m always wary of being assigned credit when none is due.”
The great Brazilian player Pelé once called soccer “the beautiful game.” He didn’t coin the phrase, but after he said it, the description stuck. Fluid, at times balletic, soccer isn’t composed of discrete events, like baseball and American football, and there aren’t dozens of scoring plays to dissect, as in basketball. Rather, much of what happens seems impossible to quantify. Talent is often judged exclusively on aesthetics. If you look like a good player, the feeling is, you probably are.
Most sports use a range of statistics to assess teams and players. Until recently, nobody in soccer cared about much beyond who scored the goals. Now we get updates on how many shots different players have taken, what percentage of the time each team has controlled the ball, and plenty of other metrics. But almost none of that seems to provide a clearer explanation of what’s happening on the field, including which team ends up winning.

For example, a ball deflected by a defensive player over the end line gives the opposition a corner kick — a goal-scoring opportunity. In theory, corners are good, and getting more of them than your opponent would seemingly indicate a successful strategy. Except that corners are more helpful to some teams than others. Teams with attackers who are skilled at redirecting centering passes work to create them, but teams with finishers who have the talent to elude defenders often prefer to take their chances in open play. Those teams don’t try to create corners, and they aren’t especially pleased when they happen.
Or consider time of possession. Teams rarely score without the ball, so having it more than the opponent sounds desirable. Yet some teams don’t want possession of the ball. If you don’t have it, you can’t give it up deep in your own end, a member of Iceland’s defensive-minded national team once told me. Iceland’s ballhandlers aren’t especially adept, so its coaches prioritize keeping the ball far from its goal. In 2016, Iceland advanced to the quarterfinals of the European championships, beating countries many times its size, including England — and tying the tournament’s eventual champion, Portugal. In none of those games did it come close to controlling the ball even half the time.

For these sorts of reasons, soccer was assumed to be unsuited to the analytical approach described in Michael Lewis’s 2003 book “Moneyball,” about how the Oakland A’s baseball team found an advantage by evaluating players using different criteria than everyone else. Soccer seemed impossible to quantify. Much of the game involves probing and assessing, moving the ball from player to player while waiting for an opening. And then the only goal might come from a winger who has done little else — after, say, a faulty clearance by a team that otherwise has been entirely dominant. “Our game is unpredictable,” says Sam Allardyce, who has managed 12 clubs over nearly three decades before Everton fired him last year. “Too unpredictable to make decisions on stats. We’re not talking about baseball or American football here.”
Chelsea created the Premier League’s first analytics department in 2008. Woolwich later bought a statistical analysis company, StatDNA. But the managers of those clubs didn’t see an advantage in applying data to the sport, or they were too busy trying to keep their jobs to figure out how to do it. A few years ago, the OptaPro analytics conference emerged in London as a way for the tiny band of soccer quants to present papers to one another. Still, all those charts with arrows and heat maps revealing where most of the action takes place seemed to have little effect on the game. As new metrics emerged, commentators and coaches took pride in repudiating them. When ESPN’s Craig Burley, a former Premier League midfielder, was asked on the air to comment about a team’s “expected goals,” a formula that calculates how often a team should have scored as opposed to how often it actually did, he replied with disbelief. “What an absolute load of nonsense that is,” he shouted. “I expect things at Christmas from Santa Claus, but they don’t come.”
But teams like Chelsea and Woolwich have resources at their disposal that allow them to accumulate the best talent. Compared with them, Liverpool was essentially in the position of those 1990s A’s teams. A different approach was necessary for it to keep up with them. And all those players running around the soccer field were clearly doing something. Every now and then, too, goals were scored. If collecting and analyzing data could help divine a connection, wasn’t it foolish not to try it?

About half an hour into a game at Anfield last January, the midfielder Naby Keita received the ball from his left and started to dribble with elongated strides. At the time, Liverpool led the Premier League, as it had for much of the season. A loss by Manchester City the previous night gave Liverpool an opening to extend that lead to seven points if it could beat Leicester City now. From his seat in the stands, Graham exhorted Keita.
“Go on, Naby,” he said, in his deep Welsh accent. “Go on!”
Keita passed two Leicester defenders. Then he hesitated for a moment and lost the ball. Graham sighed.
“Ahhhh, Naby,” he said.
Graham grew up an hour’s drive from Cardiff as a Liverpool fan. His childhood in the 1970s and ’80s coincided with Liverpool’s era of dominance. It didn’t hurt that one of the club’s best players, Ian Rush, happened to be Welsh. Before each game, he and the three analysts who work under him compile a packet of information. By the time Klopp decides which of their insights are worth passing along to the team, the equations are long gone; the players are only dimly aware that some of the suggestions are rooted in doctorate-level mathematics. “We know someone has spent hours behind closed doors figuring it out,” says the midfielder Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain. “But the manager doesn’t hit us with statistics and analytics. He just tells us what to do.” Often, the advice contradicts what someone merely watching videos of the games might come to believe. Graham and his team could report that a club’s strong-footed left winger sends booming crosses over the defense toward the goal. But the data indicates that the less impressive crosses coming from the right wing, often accurately placed, result in goals far more frequently. That sounds rudimentary. In soccer, it is practically a revolution.

Graham’s weightiest responsibility is helping Liverpool decide which players to acquire. He does that by feeding information on games into his formulas. What he doesn’t do is make evaluations by watching those games. “I don’t like video,” he says. “It biases you.” Graham wants the club that he works for to win, but he also wants his judgments to be validated. “All of these players, there has been discussion of their relative merits,” he said. “If they do badly, I take it as sort of a personal affront. If I think someone is a good player, I really, really want them to do well.”
Keita is one of Graham’s finds. Born in the West African nation Guinea, he was playing for the Austrian club Red Bull five years ago when Graham noticed the data he was generating; it was unlike any he had seen. At the time, Keita was a defensive midfielder, positioned in front of Salzburg’s defenders. Occasionally, defensive midfielders will evolve into central midfielders, who play farther forward. Keita did. Rarely, if ever, will they emerge as attacking midfielders, whose role is largely offensive. Keita did that too.
Keita’s shifting roles made a muddle of the conventional statistics used to quantify a player’s contribution to his club. For example, the position you play in soccer, unlike basketball, has a significant effect on your chances of putting the ball into the goal, or how frequently you leave your feet to nudge it from an opponent. But Graham disdains those statistics anyway. He has only slightly less contempt for some of the more evolved metrics, like the percentage of attempted passes that are completed. Instead, he spent months building a model that calculates the chance each team had of scoring a goal before any given action — a pass, a missed shot, a slide tackle — and then what chance it had immediately after that action. Using his model, he can quantify how much each player affected his team’s chance of winning during the game. Inevitably, some of the players who come out best in the familiar statistics end up at the top of Graham’s list. But others end up at the bottom.

Keita’s pass completion rate tends to be lower than that of some other elite midfielders. Graham’s figures, however, showed that Keita often tried passes that, if completed, would get the ball to a teammate in a position where he had a better than average chance of scoring. What scouts saw when they watched Keita was a versatile midfielder. What Graham saw on his laptop was a phenomenon. Here was someone continually working to move the ball into more advantageous positions, something even an attentive spectator probably wouldn’t notice unless told to look for it. Beginning in 2016, Graham recommended that Liverpool try to get him. Keita arrived at Liverpool last summer.
As of the January game against Leicester City, Keita’s play hadn’t seemed to justify Graham’s endorsement. The calculations insisted that Keita was doing as well as ever, but few fans realized that — and some of Liverpool’s executives probably didn’t, either. For Keita’s sake, and for the sake of Graham’s peace of mind, some goals or assists would help. In the second half, Keita dribbled the ball through several defenders. Somehow, he emerged with nobody between him and the goalkeeper. As Graham lifted himself halfway out of his seat in anticipation, Keita shot. At the same time, a Leicester player careened into him. The ball went wide, and to the displeasure of Liverpool’s fans, no penalty was called. Graham groaned. Soon after, Keita was removed for a substitute. Graham clapped enthusiastically as Keita left the field, but when I asked if he thought Keita had played well, he wouldn’t give me a definitive answer. He would tell me tomorrow, he said, after he looked at the data.
Graham was laboring through a two-year post-doctorate at Cambridge when he realized he didn’t want to be a scientist. Most of the breakthroughs in his area, polymer physics, had been made years before. “The classic papers had been written in the 1970s,” he says. “So you’re searching around for something you can maybe make a little progress on.” When someone forwarded him a notice for a job at an analytics start-up that was hoping to consult for soccer teams, he was intrigued. He landed the job and was told to read “Moneyball.”

For four years, from 2008 to 2012, Graham advised Tottenham. The club was run by a series of managers who had little interest in his suggestions, which would have been true of nearly all the soccer managers at that time. Then Fenway bought Liverpool and began implementing its culture. That included hiring Graham to build a version of its baseball team’s research department. The reaction, almost uniformly, was scorn. “ ‘Laptop guys,’ ‘Don’t know the game’ — you’d hear that until just a few months ago,” says Barry Hunter, who runs Liverpool’s scouting department. “The ‘Moneyball’ thing was thrown at us a lot.”
Graham hardly noticed. He was immersed in his search for inefficiencies — finding players, some hidden in plain sight, who were undervalued. One afternoon last winter, he pulled up some charts on his laptop and projected them on a screen. The charts contained statistics such as total goals, goals scored per minute and chances created, along with expected goals. I was surprised to see Graham working with such statistics, which he had described to me as simplistic. But he was making a point. “Sometimes you don’t have to look much further than that,” he said.
In 2014, Chelsea acquired the contract of the Egyptian attacking midfielder Mohamed Salah. Salah arrived with a reputation as a rising star, though in two years with a Swiss team he scored just nine goals. At Chelsea, he had what was by all accounts an undistinguished tenure, playing in 13 games over two seasons and scoring twice, while spending much of his time being loaned out to other clubs. Eventually, his contract was sold to A.S. Roma, in Italy. At that point, Salah was considered to have little chance of ever succeeding in England.

Playing in the Premier League is unique, according to the English soccer community. Competition is more balanced than elsewhere; nearly every match is a struggle. English players learn the game in frosted conditions that tend to thwart precision passing, fostering a rough, overtly physical style of play. The intensive media attention is distracting. The weather is often terrible. Some players, the assumption holds, just aren’t suited for it. But others don’t get the chance. “There’s this idea that Salah failed at Chelsea,” Graham said. “I respectfully disagree.” Based on Graham’s calculations, Salah’s productivity at Chelsea was similar to how he played before coming to England, and after he left. And those 500 minutes he played for Chelsea constituted a tiny fraction of his career. “They may be slight evidence against his quality,” Graham said, “but they are offset by 20 times the data from thousands and thousands of minutes.” In the conventional notion that playing in England is different, Graham saw an opportunity — an inefficiency in the system.
Graham recommended that Liverpool acquire Salah, who was thriving in Italy. In American sports, the team might have offered another player in exchange. In soccer, players’ rights are bought and sold in a worldwide marketplace. Once a sale price is reached, negotiations begin with the player. If he isn’t satisfied with the salary being proposed, or if he dislikes the city where the team plays or the manager he will play for, he can remain where he is. Grooming emerging talent and then selling the rights to it for a profit can help smaller teams stay solvent. Even some clubs playing in their countries’ top leagues, such as Germany’s Bayer Leverkusen, use the process to generate enough income to remain competitive. “Transfers are where the money is,” Graham said. “They are a huge component of financial performance.”
That July, Liverpool paid Roma about $41 million for Salah. Graham’s data suggested that Salah would pair especially well with Firmino, another of Liverpool’s strikers, who creates more expected goals from his passes than nearly anyone else in his position. That turned out to be the case. During the season that followed, 2017-18, Salah turned those expected goals into real ones. He broke the Premier League record by scoring 32 times. He also became the symbol of Liverpool’s revival. His crown of curly hair and infectious grin, and his stubby legs that somehow ate up ground as he raced across the turf, made him one of soccer’s most recognizable players. In what turned out to be a harbinger of this year’s progress, Liverpool made an unanticipated run to the final of last season’s Champions League. That provided the first tangible evidence that the strategies put in place by Henry and his Fenway group were working. This season, Salah was one of the three players who led the Premier League in goals. (His teammate Sadio Mané was another.) The website Transfermarkt, which tracks player valuations, estimates his current value at $173 million.

Another acquisition may have been even more important. Soon after arriving at Liverpool, Graham was asked to research a left winger at Inter Milan, Philippe Coutinho. His data strongly endorsed Coutinho. Liverpool bought Coutinho’s rights for about $16 million. Over the next five years, Coutinho’s play contributed to Liverpool’s revival. But his most important contribution was to accrue value. Last year, Barcelona paid Liverpool about $170 million for Coutinho. Soon after, Liverpool spent more than $200 million on three new players: Alisson Becker, the goalkeeper; the midfielder Fabinho; and the fullback Virgil van Dijk. All became crucial contributors this season. These were known commodities, and none came at a bargain price. But without the profit made by selling Coutinho, Henry assured me, those players would not have been acquired.

At Melwood, the club’s training complex in a residential Liverpool neighborhood, Graham works in a white-walled room, down a corridor from the coaches and the cafeteria. Tim Waskett, who studied astrophysics, sits to Graham’s left. Nearby is Dafydd Steele, a former junior chess champion with a graduate math degree who previously worked in the energy industry. The background of the most recent analyst to be hired, Will Spearman, is even less conventional. Spearman grew up in Texas, a professor’s son. He completed a doctorate in high-energy physics at Harvard. Then he worked at CERN, in Geneva, where scientists verified the existence of the subatomic Higgs boson. His dissertation provided the first direct measurement of the particle’s width, and one of the first of its mass. Another club might conceivably hire an analyst like Graham, or Steele, or Waskett, and maybe even Spearman. But it’s almost impossible to imagine any but Liverpool hiring all of them.
As often as possible, the analytics staff arrives at Melwood in time for breakfast. The food in the cafeteria includes locally sourced eggs and five or six kinds of salad greens and beef aged in a glass locker. Players sit at one of two tables with coaches and trainers. The analysts, who look like nobody else in the building, sit at an adjacent table. Greetings are cordial, even friendly. But there’s little evidence that the players know one analyst from another. The morning after the Leicester game, Graham sat with his back to Keita, their chairs touching. Hours before, he’d been shouting at Keita from the stands. Now he was within a foot of him, eating the same poached eggs, yet there was no interaction between the two of them. “If he wants to talk about the game to me, he can initiate that, and I’d be delighted,” Graham said. “Otherwise I’ll leave him in peace.”
At one point, Spearman went to get coffee. He returned with a question rooted in the intersection of breathless fandom and mathematical geekiness: Who would be the most accurately regarded player in soccer? Not the most underrated or overrated, but the one whom conventional wisdom comes closest to gauging correctly.
“It has to be Messi,” he said. “Because if he isn’t the best player in the world, he’s second. So the most that opinion could be off is one place.” As if to punctuate his point, Spearman suddenly spilled his coffee so that it streamed down the middle of the table. The analysts erupted in good-natured jibes. “You’re not doing a good job at convincing anyone that you’re not a nerd,” Waskett said.
Spearman hasn’t had much to do with Liverpool’s recent success. He does almost none of the work that Klopp sees, and he’s rarely involved with discovering players. His mandate is more ethereal. Spearman knows just enough about the sport, or just little enough, to try to change it. “We’re just starting to ask the question, ‘Why don’t we try to play football in a slightly different way?’ ” Graham explains. Soccer is the sum of thousands of individual actions, but the only ones Graham’s model can evaluate are the passes, shots and ball movements that are downloaded from the official play-by-play. “There are still fundamental limitations in the data we have,” Graham says. “It’s still like looking through a very foggy lens.” By working to get the mathematical rendering closer to reflecting what actually happens on the field, recording not just that a defender kicked a pass to a midfielder but how hard it went and what happened when it was received, Spearman is looking to find a path through the fog.

Most of his time is spent creating a model that employs video tracking. It assigns numerical scores to everything that happens to everyone, even when the ball isn’t involved. That includes a fullback racing down the sideline, forcing a lone defender to choose between two players to cover, or a striker getting into position to receive a cross directly in front of the goalkeeper, even if the pass sails over his head — “every action, how much value it adds, how well it was performed,” Spearman says. “Once you have that, you can start to create new approaches.” One might be to script plays, like in the N.F.L., radically altering the nature of a game that has resisted change for more than a century.
First, though, Liverpool needs to figure out how to beat Tottenham. Like baseball’s A’s, this current club still hasn’t won any titles. Another loss in a final, coupled with its Premier League finish behind Manchester City, could be interpreted as confirmation that analytics can get a team only so far. That would be unfair, of course. If soccer were soybeans, you could plug data into an algorithm and know just what to do. Instead, the sport is unpredictable enough to remain fascinating, filled with perfect plans foiled by the imperfections of those sent out to employ them, and undermined by the vicissitudes of chance. The jostle that threw off Keita in the Leicester City game easily could have led to a penalty shot. A successful conversion would have given Liverpool two additional points — and, ultimately, the Premier League title.
But that’s how probability works. Even when odds are diligently calculated, and the options judiciously weighed, the wrong number can still come in. The team that wins isn’t always the one employing the most elegant calculations, or even the one the models predict. It’s a lesson taught by the dice that John Henry rolled during the baseball simulations he played as a kid. That frustrates the analysts, perhaps — but it can make for a beautiful game.
Think I've just found the cure for my insomnia. ...
:sonpoint: :dierpochhug:
 
Only Man City had a higher XG (3.16) so far this weekend than us (2.57) (Liverpool 1.68) and nobody has a better XG against than the (0.64) we limited Villa to. and that was half our average per game for last season.
 
WindyCOYS WindyCOYS tweeted this today, it’s a brilliant read:


Ken Early: Football’s new age neutralises philosophies of the past

When Liverpool scored after 15 seconds against Huddersfield Town on Friday night, one common reaction would have been to bemoan the lack of competitiveness in the Premier League, and wonder if there was anything else on television. But this was one of the most interesting goals you’ll see all season, and it’s worth analysing what happened in detail.

From the kick-off, Huddersfield go back to holding midfielder Jon Gorenc Stankovic, who plays it right to central defender Christopher Schindler. Daniel Sturridge closes Schindler down, and Sadio Mane is close to the right back Tommy Smith, so Schindler plays it back to goalkeeper Jonas Lössl and runs towards the right corner of the Huddersfield box to make himself available for a return pass.

Except Sturridge has angled his run to close down Lössl such that he is also threatening that return pass to Schindler, and he has Mane in support. The other centre half, Terence Kongolo, has split to the left corner of the Huddersfield box, but Mohamed Salah is close by: too risky. The easiest available pass is up the middle to Stankovic, who is unmarked and appears to be in space.

Appearances can be deceptive. Naby Keïta is a good 15 yards away from Stankovic, on the far side of another Huddersfield midfielder, Jonathan Hogg. Hogg is pointing and gesticulating to team-mates and paying no attention to Keïta, whose orientation at this moment seems to be entirely defensive.

In fact Keïta is waiting to spring the trap. As the ball goes back to Lössl, he knows his team-mates are leaving the goalkeeper with only two options: hit it long, or pass to Stankovic in the middle. At the precise instant he sees Lössl has chosen the short rather than the long pass, Keïta takes off, goes past Hogg before Hogg realises what is happening, and arrives on Stankovic’s blindside as he turns with the ball and attempts to pass. Keïta blocks the ball to the nearby Salah, runs into the area, collects the return pass and scores.

The interesting thing about the goal was that you’d never have seen one like it in the Premier League of 10 years ago. These 15 seconds showed some of the ways the game has changed.

First, Huddersfield were trying to play the ball out from the back, rather than simply humping it into Liverpool’s half. This mightn’t seem like a very clever idea for a team like Huddersfield: maybe they’d be better off playing long ball rather than trying to be some kind of sad cargo-cult Barcelona. Sure, if Lössl had just launched it they wouldn’t have conceded this particular goal. But would they have been any more successful over the course of the season? Cardiff have been true to the old-school approach, and it hasn’t done them much good.

Huddersfield would have got away with that opening sequence against most teams. This time they were destroyed by the superb organisation of Liverpool’s press – most obviously the timing of Keïta’s burst forward into the challenge, but also the angle Sturridge chose to cut off, the positioning of Salah and Mane. It was a team goal to which four players contributed, and two of them didn’t even touch the ball.

This is what top-level football is about now – team moves so rapid and automatic you have to watch it back several times to figure out what just happened.

The game is more collective than ever, yet the players are still judged and criticised as individuals. Look at Sky’s coverage of the Manchester derby last week. The senior analysts were Roy Keane, who was the best midfielder in the league 20 years ago, and Graeme Souness, who was the best midfielder in the league 20 years before that.

At one point, Keane lost patience with Gary Neville’s reluctance to condemn United defenders Luke Shawand Matteo Darmian for their actions on the City goals.

“It’s two yards! At least close him down . . . if the guy gets a shot off no problem, get out to him! Like your life depends on it! . . . Gary, you’re on about the runners. There’s an obsession about players – oh there’s people running – but the ball’s . . . that’s the danger! There’s no runner there, the ball’s just, there’s only one ball, close it down! Don’t worry what’s going on over there or over there, close the ball down! That’s the basics!”

Keane’s scorn is always intensely watchable and the clip of this exchange has since had more than a million views on YouTube. And you might find yourself nodding along – why didn’t Shaw make a challenge, why couldn’t Darmian get a bit closer to Leroy Sané? Why won’t these young men tackle and put their bodies on the line, like they did in the good old days?


You’d almost forget that these were City’s 156th and 157th goals of the season – an all-time record in English football. How do they seem to find it so very easy to score? Is it because most of their opponents are cheats and bluffers, so rotten from too much money and first-class travel and Dr Dre headphones that they have forgotten or stopped caring about the basics of football?

Or might it have something to do with what City are doing? Their game is about systematically presenting the opponent with a bad choice, and a worse choice. Which is it going to be?

You are Luke Shaw and Bernardo Silva is coming at you on the edge of the box. Do you challenge him and risk getting dribbled or maybe conceding a penalty, or do you stand off and risk him shooting past you? You decide that David de Gea will probably have the shot covered and . . . congratulations it is 1-0 to City and you are already trending on Twitter, and not in a good way.

You are Matteo Darmian and Raheem Sterling is bearing down on your defensive line while Sergio Agüero makes a run in between you and Chris Smalling. Do you follow Agüero’s run and leave space for the advancing Sané, or do you guard the space and let Sterling play Agüero in for a one-on-one? You decide to go with Agüero, then you have to backpedal when Sterling passes to Sané and . . . congratulations, it is 2-0 to City and you are about to have your manhood questioned on live television by the world’s funniest, angriest football pundit.

There is a seductive simplicity about the notion that it’s all about character and desire: desire to get to the ball, to make the tackle, to block the shot. But this ignores how the game has changed over the last few years. There’s still only one ball – but that ball is a lot more elusive than it was in Roy Keane’s day.

Against City you either press as a team, or not at all
If you want to understand the evolution of the sport, look at some historical comparisons. Over the last 10 years, the number of passes in the Premier League has increased by more than 25 per cent. In 2007-8, teams passed the ball 358 times per game on average. In 2017-18, the average was 453 – nearly 100 passes more per game, per team.

The trend towards more passes is magnified at the top end. Woolwich were the top passers in 2007-8, averaging 495 passes per game. Last season, Manchester City’s average was 743: a full 50 per cent more than the best passing team of 10 years ago!

How do you get close to the ball when it’s moving that fast? You can do what Keane urged the United players to do, “ignore the runners” and “not worry about what’s going on over there and over there”, focus on the ball and try to “get to it, like your life depends on it” – but if you press and your team-mates don’t, then City will pass it around you and make you look foolish, and after chasing them for an hour you will find you can hardly move your legs. And that’s when they’ll start running up the score. Against City you either press as a team, or not at all; against a system like this the individual is powerless.

The rise of system football means that the English league today has less broken play, and more periods of controlled possession. In 2008, Premier League teams averaged almost 24 tackles per game. By 2017-18 the average number of tackles had dropped by almost a third, to just over 16 per game. Huddersfield Town topped the tackle table in 2017-18, with 744.

The team with the lowest number of tackles in 2008 was Reading, with 800 – so the team that made the fewest tackles 10 years ago tackled more than the team that makes the most tackles today. Interceptions have also declined, by about one-sixth. Less broken play means fewer chances for individuals to seize the moment and be the hero.

Another evolution involves crossing and the players who do it. If you compare crossing statistics from 2007-8 and this season, you notice two big changes. First, the overall numbers are down. The top 20 crossers in 2008 averaged 6.5 crosses per game, whereas in 2018-19 this group is down to 4.5 crosses per game – a drop of nearly one-third. Today’s teams don’t like giving the ball away with hit-and-hope crosses.

Second, it’s a different type of player doing the crossing. The 2008 top crossers list was made up of wingers and midfielders – names like David Bentley, Stewart Downing, Ashley Young (who was a winger back then), etc. There is only one full back in the top 20: Nicky Shorey, then of Reading. In 2018-19, eight of the top 20 crossers are full backs, with Everton’s Lucas Digne leading the way, and Jose Holebas, Kieran Trippier, Trent Alexander-Arnold and (converted full back) Ashley Young also in the top 10.

If you want full backs to cross a lot then you had better hold possession long enough to give them time to get into the opposition third. That’s one reason why, 20 years ago, full backs seldom crossed the halfway line – the other being that few players were fit enough to keep running the length of the pitch for 90 minutes. Even in 2008, defensive full backs were the norm and a player like Dani Alves – who invented the template for the modern attacking full back – still seemed like he’d been beamed back from the future.

The top managers these days are far too respectful of each other
For the state of the art in 2018-19, look at Liverpool. Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold are two of the most dangerous old-school wingers in the Premier League – which is to say, players who set up goals for team-mates by crossing from high positions. Robertson’s 11 assists are already a new Premier League record for a defender; Alexander-Arnold has nine so he too could easily match the old record of 10 this season.

The only “true” wingers with comparable assist numbers are Sané and Ryan Fraser. Robertson and Alexander-Arnold have done this while simultaneously being part of the meanest defence in the division. Moreover, despite playing with two full backs who operate as wingers and in theory leave huge spaces behind to be exploited, Liverpool have yet to concede a single goal on the counterattack in the Premier League all season.

The level of tactical organisation required to pull this off is phenomenal. It underlines the reality that football is less and less a battle between individuals, and more and more a contest of systems. At some point maybe the ex-pros who analyse the game on television will understand this and stop judging players by the standards of a sport that no longer exists.

Mind games: another lost art that people miss from title races of old. The top managers these days are far too respectful of each other.

It was interesting, last week, to see Pep Guardiola’s response to Ole Gunnar Solskjær’s mildly provocative comments to the effect that City are a great team for kicking you to the ground the second they lose the ball. Everybody who watches City knows this is true – Raheem Sterling provided another good example of the art on Sunday, when he lost the ball to Ashley Barnes on the edge of Burnley’s box, then jumped on Barnes’s back to snuff out the potential counterattack, escaping a booking.

But Guardiola doesn’t like people talking about it because then referees might start giving yellow cards for those tactical fouls. He reacted with genuine annoyance, and soon afterwards journalists were receiving data from City’s press team showing that actually, United foul more than City.

It made you wonder if there is a vulnerability there, should other managers decide to play on it. That was what José Mourinho did as manager of Real Madrid: knowing that Guardiola is already highly strung, he decided to rack up the tension to the maximum; if he’s a worrier then let’s give him something to worry about. Let’s troll and needle and provoke until he’s too tormented to think straight.

Mourinho’s tactics worked, after a fashion. Madrid won the title in 2012 and a burnt-out Guardiola left Barcelona to go on sabbatical. So why haven’t Jürgen Klopp or Mauricio Pochettino been tempted to crank up the psychological pressure on Pep?

It could be a question of personality. Klopp, plainly, is no Mourinho. Last week he did a “Jürgen Klopp answers the web’s most-searched questions about him” video for Soccer AM. Asked “What is your favourite film?” his answer was immediate and decisive: “Forrest Gump! ” Somewhere out there, José felt his lip curl without knowing why.

Or it could be that they know what they have in common is more important than what divides them. In one sense Pep is Klopp’s biggest rival. But in another, he’s a kindred spirit – one of a small group of people in English football who fully understands what he’s trying to do. One day the rest of the culture might catch up with the pair of them.
 
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Not to get into a Sissoko debate but whilst I absolutely agree that
' Technically he's still bad but he's performing well despite this, he's played around those problems, he's been coached so well by Poch a) to get him to function with his limitations b) to go beyond that and get MOTM performances out of him c) ultimately have him contribute positively to the overall performance of the team.'

You've described why Sissoko has been transformed from the player he was in the first few games at Spurs and why he is able to play a decent role for Spurs now, even (arguably) taking on some of the attributes that Dembele had.

And to tbh this is a classic result of good management, to coach a player to play well within a system and team (harking back to the original article) by bringing his best attributes out and minimising as far as possible any poor attributes.

Something Poch has done with quite a few players - although I have to say his work with Sissoko verges on transforming a seemingly impossible task into a viable solution - fine tuning some of them from good or very good players to verging in the world class.
Agree and disagree in equal measure. First I completely agree and support the notion of coaching him brilliantly for him to perform positively for the team. But where I disagree is still collectively this season we've not been great most of the season. I don't think I'm talking out of turn when I say that we've huffed and puffed a lot this season, we've deserved out points, our results haven't been lucky but we haven't flowed, haven't had the same swagger and dominance this year and the oppo have had an increased number of opportunities on our goal as in previous years.

Poch has coached him well, but Sissoko wasn't this shit fuck of a player when he first started playing for us, he wasn't anywhere near as bad as people were saying, he wasn't great but he wasn't a calamity, just boring and functional. What he is today is better but I think that is largely down to him feeling more confident, with the backing of the crowd he knows he can take the ball out of midfield and not get screamed at if it doesn't come off, he did this when he first joined (against City in his first season and he set up a wonderful counter-attack for Rose(?) against Burnley where he took the ball from inside our penalty area and laid it off to Rose 25yrd from the oppo box for him to score), but he was lambasted by the fans when these runs resulted in nothing because his shot was mishit or pass not finding it's intended target. Now when he does the same thing, like against Liverpool he's applauded for doing it...but the end result was the same a ballooned shot when 1vs1.

He's the same palyer with the same technical limitations, just playing with a lot more confidence from now understanding his function/role, he's not having to think what foot goes in front of the other. An analogy would be what happens when you are learning to drive, the learner has to think every manoeuvre, has to think every gear change, he was like like this in his first couple of seasons, this year it's like he doesn't have to think how to change gear or mirror signal manoeuvre, he just does it. But he still can't control the ball well etc but he's accepted that he doesn't have to perform in this team.

Now, this isn't solely down to Sissoko that we aren't as free-flowing but it is ONE of the reasons because he's a lesser player than Dembele playing in the same position and it's not to single out Sissoko here, we've also been without Dier and Wanyama (two players that were part of a far more dominant and free-flowing Tottenham than we have now). This also can be said about Tripps playing instead of Walker + Not having Rose (out for what was almost 2 seasons) fully fit until now. There are other things to factor on this too, such as Wembley and the World Cup and Injuries. But remove the presence of a technical player and replace with a less technical player then you are not going to get the same performance, you might, however, get the same 3 points??

Sissoko has done enough for me to warrant his place in this team, I don't want him sold but we must find a better player than him for that position in midfield if we are to improve. With a 50 game season, I'll welcome seeing Sissoko play the early rounds of FA Cup's and League Cup's and lower PL opposition (and yes I know he's put in very good performances against top teams) but we can and have played much better when we've had better players in his position. But what a very good squad player to bring in and have, he can still rack up +20 performances per season.
 
Dier seems like a smart lad and a good guy. I don't hate him or question his drive. But this is about winning, bot maintaining friendships. He served his time in midfield, but has to be looked at as a failure to materialize. We must upgrade in the middle and Dier shouldn't see the light of midfield again, even if two injuries are sustained.

I disagree. As a fan, Dier surprised everyone in the first season Poch played him in midfield. He was also a vital part of the machine that got us to where we are today. He has done jobs at right back and centre back in the past and filled in many positions when we were shit. Maybe his best position for the team is something other than CDM going forward, but no one has proven themselves good enough to boss the midfield and we have been shite tactically the entire second half of the season. Also, if he is injured and will never hit the same heights again, it is not good of supporters to forget what he did in the past. One minute he was God's gift, the next minute he was shit. Our fan base is the most fickle thing I have ever come across.
 
This was a very un-Mourinho approach, away at a top six rival setting up the team to attack and outscore rather than out defend the opposition ... with our squad this is the perfect approach to take, and it seems we have a smart and experienced manger who gets that ... glory, glory Tottenham football from Mourinho, who saw that coming?
It was pure Mourinho in the sense that it was pragmatically the best way to win the game. Jose is known for being a defensive coach - and he definitely can be a defensive coach -, but what he does fundamentally is set up his teams to explore the opposition's weaknesses. If this means playing with both FB's high up the pitch, that's what he'll do.

P. S: I agree with everything else you wrote.
 
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