Probably. Frank was still worse imo
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Competition The “We Are Staying Up” Positivity thread.
- Thread starter WillWilliams
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Better over the same time period. Nuno's 10 games were W5 L5 - F9 A16. Frank first 10 was W5 D2 L3 - F18 A8.
Nuno had Kane, Son, and overall a significantly better squad with no real injury issues. I think we would have seen an enormous slide. In retrospect - for me - what this board did by letting Frank continue should be enough to give closure to any notion that sacking Nuno that early was wrong.
I was talking about a different stretch. Chelsea and woolwich stretch
As I said, we went 2 hours and 16 minutes without a shot on target under Nuno, and one of the games was against a side that had no clean sheets in 20 games.
If anyone's forgotten what it was like under him, I'd suggest it was so bad the brain has removed memories for a inbuilt trauma reaction
As I said, we went 2 hours and 16 minutes without a shot on target under Nuno, and one of the games was against a side that had no clean sheets in 20 games.
If anyone's forgotten what it was like under him, I'd suggest it was so bad the brain has removed memories for a inbuilt trauma reaction
Nuno/Frank. Arguing over who was worse
Nuno/Frank. Arguing over who was worse
I think it's more a case of how strange it is that we've seen worse from this club in the past and not been even remotely near relegation. Two things come from it - performances don't correlate closely to results (we've played awful and scraped wins over long periods in the past), but perhaps it's looking for like the overall quality of the league is so tight now that it's quite easy to be 8th or 18th. indeed, going into the final day of the season there's only 3pts between 8th and 13th.
We lost 5 less games so far this season than last, so even if it was 4 after today you'd think that'd be an improvement on position but we're worse off.
I reckon some of our past crap managers, whether we're talking a Nuno, Ramos, Gross, Hoddle, Graham etc would have been in a lot more trouble in this era.
I do agree with that. When people say the prem is not good right now what they are really saying is the very top is weaker we don’t have peak Klopp or peak Pep but the league below the top 2/3 clubs has dramatically improved. Clubs like Brentford and Bournemouth could easily give Barcelona a game and maybe beat them and that means you can’t coast.
Not making a ‘stressed’ purchase in Jan when the league is so competitive was a mistake, not sacking Frank was a mistake. Vinai and Lange thought they could write off the season and we finish 12th. Despite the arrogance in that it is simply not possible anymore. I remember the AVB/Sherwood season and how awful we where but below the top 5 teams everyone was shit so it didn’t really matter.
They had a month to sign players and didnt - we all know the money is there if we need it, 9th richest club in the world and all that.
Its largely down to the fact that Lange is a weapons-grade c*nt who Villa were very glad to be shot of, because hes shit at his job.
Yeah exactly. Chelsea are 9 points off being 16th. That's in a season where Enzo Maresca walked away from his term with a 60% win rate, and Liam Rosenior was just under 50%.
It takes you into the bigger picture where you can see just how easy it is for VAR to be the difference between qualifying for Europe or under a relegation threat.
Even the 5 wins between Brighton and us is quite easily to reconcile, even though causality etc etc:
- Maddison penalty vs Leeds / stupid Tel foul
- Rutter last kick equaliser for Brighton
- Sunderland game with a few VAR incidents, not least Brobbey pushing romero
Even the Woolwich VAR one with RKM "push" would have possibly denied them the title
Lange doesn’t know his arse from his elbow.
How did we end up with only two wingers Kudus and Odobert and both are injured, Tel is more second striker?
How did we end up with no deep lying playmaker?
How did we end up with so many 8’s who are all so similar?
This isn’t quality issues but squad profiling which is what the sporting/technical director is suppose to fix.
Because hes a weapons-grade c*nt who is shit at his job
I believe in the team and that they can collect all three points today.
Come on you Spurs!!!!
Come on you Spurs!!!!
It's funny, I'm on the bus on my way in, seeing people getting on and off with summer attire, picnic stuff, enjoying the sunshine without a care in the world. ...
I'm envious, but also, would t swap it for the world!
Apart from the two other terrified looking Spurs fans on here with me, it's a bus loaded with positivity and happiness!
I'm bottling that and taking it into the ground with me ... Except there's no bottles around, but you KNOW WHAT I MEAN!
Last time we played Everton on the last day, was in 2019, a week before the CL final, we also only needed a draw...
It was ALSO a gloriously sunny day,and the mood was at an all time high!
We need to remember where we put that feeling... Dig it out and put it on display for ALL TO SEE ABD EMBRACE!
We GOT THIS SPURS!!
I'm envious, but also, would t swap it for the world!
Apart from the two other terrified looking Spurs fans on here with me, it's a bus loaded with positivity and happiness!
I'm bottling that and taking it into the ground with me ... Except there's no bottles around, but you KNOW WHAT I MEAN!
Last time we played Everton on the last day, was in 2019, a week before the CL final, we also only needed a draw...
It was ALSO a gloriously sunny day,and the mood was at an all time high!
We need to remember where we put that feeling... Dig it out and put it on display for ALL TO SEE ABD EMBRACE!
We GOT THIS SPURS!!
I think that it's quite obvious why Levy didn't want him to have that role and kept Paratici around. My point is nothing at all to do with anything about how Paratici was, but purely how obvious it was that Lange was seen as a different role for an obvious reason.
Add the ineptitude of Venkatesham/board (at least in their communications) to expect Paratici to be doing something when he was already leaving.
It's been a season of power struggles with people underestimating the power they won
Admin
delete this thread as well
WARNING HUGE BLOCK OF TEXT BELOW THAT YOU DONT HAVE TO READ BUT MIGHT FIND INTERESTING MAYBE...
!!
I had a debate with AI on whether or not Vinai's appointment of Tudor could have been considered one of the worst financial decisions anyone has ever made in football - yes you can argue about lots of factors and of course we were already deep in trouble but as a single decision it was on him.
In summary:-
Had Spurs gone down, historians of the game would have had a strong case that a single, poor hiring decision — made by the wrong person, at the wrong time, drawing on the wrong logic — cost one of England's founding Premier League clubs somewhere between £400m and £1bn in total value destruction. That would have been genuinely unprecedented in scale.
No way again in any other industry, any job, anywhere at all - that you keep your job after making that call. Look forward to seeing news TODAY he's gone and takes Lange with him.
Tottenham's pre-tax loss widened significantly from £26m to £121m in 2024/25, the club's worst ever result, despite revenue rising to £565m. This was the first time Spurs had finished outside the top ten for 17 years.
Net assets are £620m, with total debt down slightly to £1.243bn and net debt up to £831.2m.
So they are already deeply loss-making, highly leveraged, and sitting on £831m of net debt — before relegation. That context matters enormously for what follows.
Broadcasting collapse. Tottenham's revenue line in 2025 was £565.3m, with £161.7m of that from broadcasting including UEFA distributions. It is highly likely that some commercial deals would have break or renegotiation clauses triggered by relegation.
Parachute payments in year 1 would amount to approximately £48.95m — leaving a net broadcast revenue deficit of around £60m compared to even a bottom-three Premier League club. For Spurs specifically, whose broadcast income included European money, the real gap is closer to £100-115m in year one alone.
Match receipts. Their £126.5m in PL matchday revenue would crater to an estimated £35-45m in the Championship — a loss of £80m+. The stadium's NFL and concert revenue would partially survive, but the football income is gone.
Commercial erosion. Commercial revenue hit a new club record of £277.1m, with the multi-use stadium playing a vital role. Relegation clauses in major sponsorship deals are standard at this level. A conservative 20-25% hit on commercial revenue is £55-70m.
Year 1 total revenue loss: approximately £200-250m
A club already posting a £121m pre-tax loss in the Premier League would, in the Championship, be looking at annual losses in the region of £300-370m — with a debt pile already sitting at £831m net. That is not a financial problem. That is an existential crisis.
Parachute drops to ~£40m in year two. Relegation for a club of Tottenham's stature could mean losing upwards of £200m in club revenue, and Spurs would likely be favourites to come straight back up — but that should not be taken as a given.
By year two, the squad haemorrhage accelerates. Players with release clauses — almost every top earner — trigger them. The wage bill, currently £256m, doesn't fall proportionally because contracts are fixed. You end up paying Premier League wages for Championship football. The wage-to-revenue ratio, already high at 45%, would explode past 80-90%.
Net worth / asset impact across two years:
Igor Tudor was sacked by Tottenham after just seven games across 44 days, with his record as Spurs boss being one Premier League point. Tudor was appointed on February 13 as successor to Thomas Frank, but was moved on with the threat of Premier League relegation continuing to loom.
Tudor picked up just one point from his five Premier League matches — a 1-1 draw with Liverpool — and also oversaw a last-16 exit from the Champions League following a 7-5 aggregate defeat to Atletico Madrid.
Venkatesham and sporting director Johan Lange appear to have thought sticking to their guns was a smarter approach than panicking — but the appointment accelerated the crisis rather than arresting it.
His track record was a red flag, not a recommendation. Tudor's last role ended in the sack when Juventus dismissed him in October after just seven months in charge, amid an eight-game winless run where Juventus failed to score in four games. He was pattern-matched to the interim role he did at Juventus previously — but that was a stabilisation job at a top-four club with no relegation pressure. Applying the same logic to a club one point above the drop zone showed a fundamental misreading of the situation.
The appointment was made at the worst possible moment. A relegation dogfight in February, with 7 games to go in meaningful terms, requires a manager who knows the squad, knows the league, and can immediately forge a survival mentality. Tudor had never worked in English football. His first game as Spurs boss ended in a damaging 4-1 defeat to Woolwich, with the club in real danger of being dragged into a relegation battle.
He actively made things worse. Tottenham conceded two or more goals in nine successive league matches for the first time in their history under Tudor. They lost five successive league games and went without a win in 11 consecutive top-flight matches for the first time in decades.
Jamie Carragher publicly called Tudor "the worst appointment in Spurs' history" and demanded that Lange, Venkatesham, and Tudor all be sacked immediately.
It burned irreplaceable time. The 44 days Tudor spent at the club were 44 days not spent with De Zerbi (who eventually came in and drove the survival push). Every point dropped during that window was potentially irrecoverable.
The honest answer: yes, it has a legitimate claim.
The argument isn't just that Tudor was bad — it's that the decision was made by Venkatesham at the single highest-stakes moment in Tottenham's modern history, at a club with £565m in annual revenue, and it resulted in near-categorical failure. Every week of Tudor's tenure pushed the club closer to a revenue cliff edge worth £200-250m in year one alone.
For historical comparison:
What makes the Tudor decision distinctive as a potential all-time error is the combination of:
Had Spurs gone down, historians of the game would have had a strong case that a single, poor hiring decision — made by the wrong person, at the wrong time, drawing on the wrong logic — cost one of England's founding Premier League clubs somewhere between £400m and £1bn in total value destruction. That would have been genuinely unprecedented in scale.
!!I had a debate with AI on whether or not Vinai's appointment of Tudor could have been considered one of the worst financial decisions anyone has ever made in football - yes you can argue about lots of factors and of course we were already deep in trouble but as a single decision it was on him.
In summary:-
Had Spurs gone down, historians of the game would have had a strong case that a single, poor hiring decision — made by the wrong person, at the wrong time, drawing on the wrong logic — cost one of England's founding Premier League clubs somewhere between £400m and £1bn in total value destruction. That would have been genuinely unprecedented in scale.
No way again in any other industry, any job, anywhere at all - that you keep your job after making that call. Look forward to seeing news TODAY he's gone and takes Lange with him.
The Financial Stakes: Tottenham Relegation
The baseline you're working from
Tottenham's pre-tax loss widened significantly from £26m to £121m in 2024/25, the club's worst ever result, despite revenue rising to £565m. This was the first time Spurs had finished outside the top ten for 17 years.
Net assets are £620m, with total debt down slightly to £1.243bn and net debt up to £831.2m.
So they are already deeply loss-making, highly leveraged, and sitting on £831m of net debt — before relegation. That context matters enormously for what follows.
Year 1 in the Championship
Broadcasting collapse. Tottenham's revenue line in 2025 was £565.3m, with £161.7m of that from broadcasting including UEFA distributions. It is highly likely that some commercial deals would have break or renegotiation clauses triggered by relegation.
Parachute payments in year 1 would amount to approximately £48.95m — leaving a net broadcast revenue deficit of around £60m compared to even a bottom-three Premier League club. For Spurs specifically, whose broadcast income included European money, the real gap is closer to £100-115m in year one alone.
Match receipts. Their £126.5m in PL matchday revenue would crater to an estimated £35-45m in the Championship — a loss of £80m+. The stadium's NFL and concert revenue would partially survive, but the football income is gone.
Commercial erosion. Commercial revenue hit a new club record of £277.1m, with the multi-use stadium playing a vital role. Relegation clauses in major sponsorship deals are standard at this level. A conservative 20-25% hit on commercial revenue is £55-70m.
Year 1 total revenue loss: approximately £200-250m
A club already posting a £121m pre-tax loss in the Premier League would, in the Championship, be looking at annual losses in the region of £300-370m — with a debt pile already sitting at £831m net. That is not a financial problem. That is an existential crisis.
Year 2 in the Championship (if not promoted)
Parachute drops to ~£40m in year two. Relegation for a club of Tottenham's stature could mean losing upwards of £200m in club revenue, and Spurs would likely be favourites to come straight back up — but that should not be taken as a given.
By year two, the squad haemorrhage accelerates. Players with release clauses — almost every top earner — trigger them. The wage bill, currently £256m, doesn't fall proportionally because contracts are fixed. You end up paying Premier League wages for Championship football. The wage-to-revenue ratio, already high at 45%, would explode past 80-90%.
Net worth / asset impact across two years:
- Net assets of £620m would likely fall to £250-350m, after accumulated losses and player asset write-downs
- The club's valuation (currently ~$2.2bn per CNBC) would collapse — Leicester, a comparable case post-relegation, saw their valuation hit badly even with a far smaller revenue base
- The £1.243bn debt with a shrinking asset base creates genuine covenant risk with lenders
- Total financial damage over two years: £400-550m in revenue destruction, with knock-on club valuation erosion potentially pushing total value destruction past £700m-£1bn
The Tudor Question: One of the Most Costly Managerial Decisions in Football History?
What actually happened
Igor Tudor was sacked by Tottenham after just seven games across 44 days, with his record as Spurs boss being one Premier League point. Tudor was appointed on February 13 as successor to Thomas Frank, but was moved on with the threat of Premier League relegation continuing to loom.
Tudor picked up just one point from his five Premier League matches — a 1-1 draw with Liverpool — and also oversaw a last-16 exit from the Champions League following a 7-5 aggregate defeat to Atletico Madrid.
Venkatesham and sporting director Johan Lange appear to have thought sticking to their guns was a smarter approach than panicking — but the appointment accelerated the crisis rather than arresting it.
Why appointing Tudor was so obviously wrong
His track record was a red flag, not a recommendation. Tudor's last role ended in the sack when Juventus dismissed him in October after just seven months in charge, amid an eight-game winless run where Juventus failed to score in four games. He was pattern-matched to the interim role he did at Juventus previously — but that was a stabilisation job at a top-four club with no relegation pressure. Applying the same logic to a club one point above the drop zone showed a fundamental misreading of the situation.
The appointment was made at the worst possible moment. A relegation dogfight in February, with 7 games to go in meaningful terms, requires a manager who knows the squad, knows the league, and can immediately forge a survival mentality. Tudor had never worked in English football. His first game as Spurs boss ended in a damaging 4-1 defeat to Woolwich, with the club in real danger of being dragged into a relegation battle.
He actively made things worse. Tottenham conceded two or more goals in nine successive league matches for the first time in their history under Tudor. They lost five successive league games and went without a win in 11 consecutive top-flight matches for the first time in decades.
Jamie Carragher publicly called Tudor "the worst appointment in Spurs' history" and demanded that Lange, Venkatesham, and Tudor all be sacked immediately.
It burned irreplaceable time. The 44 days Tudor spent at the club were 44 days not spent with De Zerbi (who eventually came in and drove the survival push). Every point dropped during that window was potentially irrecoverable.
Could This Be One of the Most Costly Mistakes in Football History?
The honest answer: yes, it has a legitimate claim.
The argument isn't just that Tudor was bad — it's that the decision was made by Venkatesham at the single highest-stakes moment in Tottenham's modern history, at a club with £565m in annual revenue, and it resulted in near-categorical failure. Every week of Tudor's tenure pushed the club closer to a revenue cliff edge worth £200-250m in year one alone.
For historical comparison:
- Leeds' self-destruction post-Champions League (2003-04): catastrophic, but off a revenue base of ~£80m — smaller in absolute terms
- Sunderland falling to League One: devastating, but from a smaller financial platform
- The closest parallel might be Derby County's administration, but that was multi-year mismanagement, not a single appointment
What makes the Tudor decision distinctive as a potential all-time error is the combination of:
- The absolute size of the financial exposure (£200m+ year one, £400-500m over two years)
- The clarity of the risk at the time of appointment — this was not an optimistic gamble, it was an appointment of a recently-sacked manager with a known failure pattern
- The speed and totality of the failure (1 PL point in 5 games)
- The fact that it was an in-season decision where the status quo (Frank) could arguably have been kept longer, or a more experienced survival specialist brought in
- That Venkatesham is a CEO, not a football man — appointing a head coach in a relegation fight is exactly the kind of call that requires deep football expertise, which the structure at Spurs arguably doesn't have in the right seat
Had Spurs gone down, historians of the game would have had a strong case that a single, poor hiring decision — made by the wrong person, at the wrong time, drawing on the wrong logic — cost one of England's founding Premier League clubs somewhere between £400m and £1bn in total value destruction. That would have been genuinely unprecedented in scale.