TFC's Tactical Autopsy Thread

I wasn't sure where to mention this so thought I would post about it here. It's something that has bothered me under both Poch and now under Mourinho.

I could have taken about 100 photos of last night's game and tens of others regarding it.

When one of our players is in possession of the ball he never has more than one option to pass to. It drives me mad. The players just don't make themselves available for the ball and they stand still far too often and it happens all over the pitch.

Is it laziness from the players or is it that they don't want to move out of position and ruin the structure of the team?

Thankfully, Mourinho has said we started more attack training yesterday so hopefully we will see more movement, but its something that drives me mad.
 
This article was based on the Everton game, but it goes into detail and highlights how this has been a theme under Mourinho, it puts some detail on why we were so poor against Everton, which carried on, in many ways against Southampton. Our inability to press teams properly. Not just actually trundling around looking like pressing, but doing it properly, cohesively. We attempted half the pressures against Southampton (118) than we did Everton (220) and were successful (regaining possession 5 seconds from pressing event) about the same percentage (Eve 19.5% Sot 23%). I spoke in the Southampton thread about the folly of the first half tactical clusterfuck of playing a high line, with our RB pushed up, whilst not pressuring the ball, and Southampton scored like this and got into us several times. It was just a miracle that Kane and Son did something unique to the PL history that day.



Was Spurs’ pressure lazy? Yes, but that’s not their pressing problem – this is

“I’m disappointed with my team.”

There are few things worse for a manager to say after an opening game of a new season, but that’s exactly what Jose Mourinho told reporters after his side’s defeat by Everton on Sunday.

Spurs lost 1-0, and were outshot (15 to nine) and out xG’d (1.2 to 1.13) in the process. On paper, that says they were slightly unfortunate to come away from the game without any points, given Everton didn’t batter them in terms of the quality of chances that they created.

Matt Doherty had his now-characteristic big chance of the match after floating in from the right, and Dele Alli also had a great opportunity to score (worth 0.36 xG, Spurs’ best chance of the game), although that was arguably a bad outcome, and one reflective of new-season rustiness, given Spurs created this…




…from this…



Nevertheless, this is a team who have top-six aspirations and should be either creating far better chances or limiting those of their opposition.

The main source of Mourinho’s disappointment (despite the result) was how his side attempted to press Everton. “Lazy pressure” was what he labelled his side’s attempts to close down their opponent, especially when Everton were passing out from the back.

So, was Spurs’ pressure lazy?

PPDA, or passes allowed per opponent defensive action, is one such proxy to try and capture the degree to which an opponent is pressuring the opposition. For those unfamiliar, the stat looks to count the number of times that a team attempts a defensive action, such as a tackle or interception, compared to the number of times the opposition attempts a pass.

A low PPDA number indicates higher intensity when trying to win the ball back and a higher figure indicates a team that is more passive without the ball.

Spurs’ PPDA for the game against Everton sat at 11.9, lower than Mourinho’s average of 12.4 since joining last November and slightly lower than the league average too. All models are wrong but some are useful, as the saying goes, and that’s definitely the case here. PPDA tells us that Tottenham tried to press, but it doesn’t give us any indication of the successful execution of that strategy — or the degree of laziness, if we’re talking in Mourinho’s language.


Another perspective is required, one that attempts to understand the quality of a press, not the mere presence of it.

One means of understanding this is to consider how many times a team pressures the ball, and how often that leads to a turnover of possession. Statsbomb pressure data via fbref calculates exactly this and can help to evaluate the quality of a press. Again, no model is perfect, but it’s a good enough proxy.

Spurs pressured Everton 220 times and, of those, won possession of the ball back just 43 times within five seconds. As a percentage, that indicates Tottenham’s pressure was successful 19.5 per cent of the time, the lowest figure in the Premier League so far this season, just a touch below Fulham (19.6 per cent).

Spurs were applying pressure, but it wasn’t leading to turnovers, and also failing to stop Everton from getting into the final third or progressing through to the middle of the field. Lazy pressure indeed.

So does the blame automatically go to the players though? Well, not entirely.

Pressing isn’t a binary tactic. You don’t decide as a manager that you want your team to press, and it suddenly is a successful means of approaching the game when out of possession.

Pressing can be co-ordinated and deadly if employed correctly, something with which Spurs fans are only too familiar, given they were one of the best pressing sides in the league during the early years of Mauricio Pochettino’s reign at the club.

Mourinho succinctly summed up the impact of a bad press to Sky Sports after the game, saying “when you have lazy pressure, you don’t press, you allow opponents to build from the back. Lazy pressure up front creates unbalanced situations for the rest of the team”.

The key part of that first quote is how lazy pressure means you don’t press. That’s an important delineation to bear in mind. Pressure comes from one player, a press is the co-ordination of multiple pressures simultaneously or sequentially.

Think of a time when you’ve played football and you’ve chased down the player on the ball, only for them to fully alleviate all the pressure you applied by making a simple sideways pass to a free team-mate. That was good pressurefrom you (give yourself a pat on the back) but bad pressing (give your team-mates the hairdryer after the match).

The knowledge of when and where to press in a game to form an effective press has to come from training, and that’s on the coaching staff.

Going back to the numbers, Tottenham’s 220 pressures was the most in the Premier League this weekend, and the third-highest in a game under Mourinho. That’s ammunition to suggest that the level of effort was there from the players, but the co-ordination of the press wasn’t.

Here’s one such example of that lack of co-ordination. Everton start with a goal kick in the fourth minute of the game, and Jordan Pickford elects to play it short. Yerry Mina receives the ball from Pickford, which triggers Alli to pressure the Colombian…



…but given the lengths Alli has to go to, Mina has time to coolly play it square to Michael Keane, who is under no pressure from Harry Kane. Kane jogs in Lucas Digne’s general direction with little conviction, and Keane passes the ball out to him.



Lucas Moura is triggered to start pressuring Digne when the Frenchman receives the ball. Digne is still able to get the ball down the line with relative ease. While he makes the pass, Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg sprints to close down Andre Gomes, leaving a big gap behind him.



Richarlison receives the ball and is under intense pressure from Doherty. A heavy touch should be pounced on by Spurs, but the ball pops back to Digne…



…who gets a pass off to Abdoulaye Doucoure ahead of Hojbjerg…



…who knocks it back to Gomes despite being under pressure from Harry Winks…



…who sprays it out wide to Seamus Coleman.



From there, Everton manage to get the ball into the box, but a Richarlison air-shot ends the sequence of play. Below is an overhead view of how that sequence unfolded.



There’s another example again in the 28th minute. Jordan Pickford receives the ball and is being closed down by Kane.



Kane’s pressure is fairly poor, however, and Pickford is easily able to step past him and slot the ball through to Gomes in midfield, with Allan moving to the right side of the pitch to make space for Gomes in behind. Hojbjerg again is very aggressive in his movement, following Allan without thinking of what’s happening behind him.

Again, Spurs’ structure in this situation is pretty poor. Kane’s pressing was lazy here, yes, but there’s no player on the left side of the field to close down Gomes or stop Keane — who is stood behind Kane inside the box — from being an easy passing option.



Again, this move progresses upfield fairly quickly from here, reaching the penalty area, as you can see from the pass map below.



These examples point to a clear lack of principles: the when and where aren’t clear, and all of the effort that’s required to turn pressure into pressing is wasted.

There’s also a clear thread in both examples of Hojbjerg’s high-energy approach, which provides a wonderful example of why sprint distance and speed without context is useless. The Dane may need some time to unlearn the high-octane pressing style that he was a part of at Southampton.

Is this a case of paralysis by analysis, and we’re zooming in too much on a single game? Again, the data shows perhaps not. Here’s that successful pressure metric again, for each of Spurs’ games since the start of last season.

There was a clear fluctuation in the effectiveness of the pressing for Spurs under Pochettino and Mourinho before the COVID-19-enforced lockdown. Since the restart, there’s a clear downward trend on Spurs’ inability to apply pressure effectively.



It’s tough to predict which direction this will go in next, but for now, it seems clear that Spurs’ pressing, while present, isn’t all that effective. There are structural issues that need addressing.

So how do Spurs and Mourinho go about mending the press?

One such solution is to forget the press entirely and elect instead to clog the midfield and block the passing lanes that lead to easy ball progression. Spurs have great counter-attacking options and can use the energy they’re preserving from not applying pressure to break from deep instead.

This could either be a longer-term strategy — and that may well be the best option, given Mourinho hasn’t had overly effective pressing sides in the past — or just one to use until the squad is back to match fitness.

The alternative solution would be to use training to better teach the players about the triggers of when and where to apply pressure, turning Tottenham’s individual efforts to win the ball back into a more cohesive, mechanistic method when out of possession. History tells us that this is a big ask: Mourinho’s teams haven’t ever really been lauded for their high-pressing approach, especially not in a way that is comparable to effective high-pressing teams in the modern game.

Mourinho’s attempt to employ a pressing strategy after the shortest (and weirdest) pre-season ever does feel somewhat short-sighted, and also part of a recent trend in Spurs’ inability to turn pressure into pressing.

Of course, Tottenham’s season doesn’t hinge on one game, but how the side bounces back after an opening-day defeat, and either looks to fix or abandon the press, is one of the main themes to pay attention to in their next few games.
 
This article was based on the Everton game, but it goes into detail and highlights how this has been a theme under Mourinho, it puts some detail on why we were so poor against Everton, which carried on, in many ways against Southampton. Our inability to press teams properly. Not just actually trundling around looking like pressing, but doing it properly, cohesively. We attempted half the pressures against Southampton (118) than we did Everton (220) and were successful (regaining possession 5 seconds from pressing event) about the same percentage (Eve 19.5% Sot 23%). I spoke in the Southampton thread about the folly of the first half tactical clusterfuck of playing a high line, with our RB pushed up, whilst not pressuring the ball, and Southampton scored like this and got into us several times. It was just a miracle that Kane and Son did something unique to the PL history that day.



Was Spurs’ pressure lazy? Yes, but that’s not their pressing problem – this is

“I’m disappointed with my team.”

There are few things worse for a manager to say after an opening game of a new season, but that’s exactly what Jose Mourinho told reporters after his side’s defeat by Everton on Sunday.

Spurs lost 1-0, and were outshot (15 to nine) and out xG’d (1.2 to 1.13) in the process. On paper, that says they were slightly unfortunate to come away from the game without any points, given Everton didn’t batter them in terms of the quality of chances that they created.

Matt Doherty had his now-characteristic big chance of the match after floating in from the right, and Dele Alli also had a great opportunity to score (worth 0.36 xG, Spurs’ best chance of the game), although that was arguably a bad outcome, and one reflective of new-season rustiness, given Spurs created this…




…from this…



Nevertheless, this is a team who have top-six aspirations and should be either creating far better chances or limiting those of their opposition.

The main source of Mourinho’s disappointment (despite the result) was how his side attempted to press Everton. “Lazy pressure” was what he labelled his side’s attempts to close down their opponent, especially when Everton were passing out from the back.

So, was Spurs’ pressure lazy?

PPDA, or passes allowed per opponent defensive action, is one such proxy to try and capture the degree to which an opponent is pressuring the opposition. For those unfamiliar, the stat looks to count the number of times that a team attempts a defensive action, such as a tackle or interception, compared to the number of times the opposition attempts a pass.

A low PPDA number indicates higher intensity when trying to win the ball back and a higher figure indicates a team that is more passive without the ball.

Spurs’ PPDA for the game against Everton sat at 11.9, lower than Mourinho’s average of 12.4 since joining last November and slightly lower than the league average too. All models are wrong but some are useful, as the saying goes, and that’s definitely the case here. PPDA tells us that Tottenham tried to press, but it doesn’t give us any indication of the successful execution of that strategy — or the degree of laziness, if we’re talking in Mourinho’s language.


Another perspective is required, one that attempts to understand the quality of a press, not the mere presence of it.

One means of understanding this is to consider how many times a team pressures the ball, and how often that leads to a turnover of possession. Statsbomb pressure data via fbref calculates exactly this and can help to evaluate the quality of a press. Again, no model is perfect, but it’s a good enough proxy.

Spurs pressured Everton 220 times and, of those, won possession of the ball back just 43 times within five seconds. As a percentage, that indicates Tottenham’s pressure was successful 19.5 per cent of the time, the lowest figure in the Premier League so far this season, just a touch below Fulham (19.6 per cent).

Spurs were applying pressure, but it wasn’t leading to turnovers, and also failing to stop Everton from getting into the final third or progressing through to the middle of the field. Lazy pressure indeed.

So does the blame automatically go to the players though? Well, not entirely.

Pressing isn’t a binary tactic. You don’t decide as a manager that you want your team to press, and it suddenly is a successful means of approaching the game when out of possession.

Pressing can be co-ordinated and deadly if employed correctly, something with which Spurs fans are only too familiar, given they were one of the best pressing sides in the league during the early years of Mauricio Pochettino’s reign at the club.

Mourinho succinctly summed up the impact of a bad press to Sky Sports after the game, saying “when you have lazy pressure, you don’t press, you allow opponents to build from the back. Lazy pressure up front creates unbalanced situations for the rest of the team”.

The key part of that first quote is how lazy pressure means you don’t press. That’s an important delineation to bear in mind. Pressure comes from one player, a press is the co-ordination of multiple pressures simultaneously or sequentially.

Think of a time when you’ve played football and you’ve chased down the player on the ball, only for them to fully alleviate all the pressure you applied by making a simple sideways pass to a free team-mate. That was good pressurefrom you (give yourself a pat on the back) but bad pressing (give your team-mates the hairdryer after the match).

The knowledge of when and where to press in a game to form an effective press has to come from training, and that’s on the coaching staff.

Going back to the numbers, Tottenham’s 220 pressures was the most in the Premier League this weekend, and the third-highest in a game under Mourinho. That’s ammunition to suggest that the level of effort was there from the players, but the co-ordination of the press wasn’t.

Here’s one such example of that lack of co-ordination. Everton start with a goal kick in the fourth minute of the game, and Jordan Pickford elects to play it short. Yerry Mina receives the ball from Pickford, which triggers Alli to pressure the Colombian…



…but given the lengths Alli has to go to, Mina has time to coolly play it square to Michael Keane, who is under no pressure from Harry Kane. Kane jogs in Lucas Digne’s general direction with little conviction, and Keane passes the ball out to him.



Lucas Moura is triggered to start pressuring Digne when the Frenchman receives the ball. Digne is still able to get the ball down the line with relative ease. While he makes the pass, Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg sprints to close down Andre Gomes, leaving a big gap behind him.



Richarlison receives the ball and is under intense pressure from Doherty. A heavy touch should be pounced on by Spurs, but the ball pops back to Digne…



…who gets a pass off to Abdoulaye Doucoure ahead of Hojbjerg…



…who knocks it back to Gomes despite being under pressure from Harry Winks…



…who sprays it out wide to Seamus Coleman.



From there, Everton manage to get the ball into the box, but a Richarlison air-shot ends the sequence of play. Below is an overhead view of how that sequence unfolded.



There’s another example again in the 28th minute. Jordan Pickford receives the ball and is being closed down by Kane.



Kane’s pressure is fairly poor, however, and Pickford is easily able to step past him and slot the ball through to Gomes in midfield, with Allan moving to the right side of the pitch to make space for Gomes in behind. Hojbjerg again is very aggressive in his movement, following Allan without thinking of what’s happening behind him.

Again, Spurs’ structure in this situation is pretty poor. Kane’s pressing was lazy here, yes, but there’s no player on the left side of the field to close down Gomes or stop Keane — who is stood behind Kane inside the box — from being an easy passing option.



Again, this move progresses upfield fairly quickly from here, reaching the penalty area, as you can see from the pass map below.



These examples point to a clear lack of principles: the when and where aren’t clear, and all of the effort that’s required to turn pressure into pressing is wasted.

There’s also a clear thread in both examples of Hojbjerg’s high-energy approach, which provides a wonderful example of why sprint distance and speed without context is useless. The Dane may need some time to unlearn the high-octane pressing style that he was a part of at Southampton.

Is this a case of paralysis by analysis, and we’re zooming in too much on a single game? Again, the data shows perhaps not. Here’s that successful pressure metric again, for each of Spurs’ games since the start of last season.

There was a clear fluctuation in the effectiveness of the pressing for Spurs under Pochettino and Mourinho before the COVID-19-enforced lockdown. Since the restart, there’s a clear downward trend on Spurs’ inability to apply pressure effectively.



It’s tough to predict which direction this will go in next, but for now, it seems clear that Spurs’ pressing, while present, isn’t all that effective. There are structural issues that need addressing.

So how do Spurs and Mourinho go about mending the press?

One such solution is to forget the press entirely and elect instead to clog the midfield and block the passing lanes that lead to easy ball progression. Spurs have great counter-attacking options and can use the energy they’re preserving from not applying pressure to break from deep instead.

This could either be a longer-term strategy — and that may well be the best option, given Mourinho hasn’t had overly effective pressing sides in the past — or just one to use until the squad is back to match fitness.


The alternative solution would be to use training to better teach the players about the triggers of when and where to apply pressure, turning Tottenham’s individual efforts to win the ball back into a more cohesive, mechanistic method when out of possession. History tells us that this is a big ask: Mourinho’s teams haven’t ever really been lauded for their high-pressing approach, especially not in a way that is comparable to effective high-pressing teams in the modern game.

Mourinho’s attempt to employ a pressing strategy after the shortest (and weirdest) pre-season ever does feel somewhat short-sighted, and also part of a recent trend in Spurs’ inability to turn pressure into pressing.

Of course, Tottenham’s season doesn’t hinge on one game, but how the side bounces back after an opening-day defeat, and either looks to fix or abandon the press, is one of the main themes to pay attention to in their next few games.

Great writeup BC! Thoroughly impressed by your analysis.

That bolded bit above; isn't that how Joao Sacramento had the team set up at Lille? I never really watched them play when he was part of the staff, but I heard they performed well during a span by just launching the counter and playing rather conservatively. Is that the case?
 
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Great writeup BC! Thoroughly impressed by your analysis.

That bolded bit above; isn't that how Joao Sacramento had the team set up at Lille? I never really watched them play when he was part of the staff, but I heard they performed well during a span by just launching the counter and playing rather conservatively. Is that the case?

Not mine, it's from The Athletic.

I'll mull on the Sacramento question and get back tomorrow, got to sleep now.
 
[QUOTE="bus-conductor, post: 2487478, member: 6078"

The alternative solution would be to use training to better teach the players about the triggers of when and where to apply pressure, turning Tottenham’s individual efforts to win the ball back into a more cohesive, mechanistic method when out of possession. History tells us that this is a big ask: Mourinho’s teams haven’t ever really been lauded for their high-pressing approach, especially not in a way that is comparable to effective high-pressing teams in the modern game.


[/QUOTE]

1. One thing we know from Poch's time is that an effective press can be devastating for the oppo. 10 outfield men playing as a team, all knowing their role and everyone doing it every time. It's very easy for me to say that, but it's far harder for those 10 men to get it right. When Liverpool do it well, it's bloody hard to get out of your box and it's just stupid for Hugo to play it short to Sanchez or whomever. Just asking for trouble.

2. An ineffective press is not just useless, it's actually harmful. The other team will just pick you off, even if in their own box. Within seconds they will have a 3 on2 somewhere in MF or further up the pitch, and you're in big trouble, again.

I remember seeing Redknapp's Spurs playing Rodgers' Swansea. They'd been promoted and were doing well in the PL with a strategy of hard pressing. Spurs won it comfortably by hard pressing them, but only when they crossed the half way line.

I liked that idea because it's simple for a team to understand. The white line on halfway is plainly visible. It's also easier on the fitness and stamina of the team. You can pretty much do that all game, every game.

Another damaging aspect of an ineffective press - it will destroy team ethos and morale. If I've pressed the keeper well in his area, but he can find a simple 10 yard square ball to a full back because the other strikers and AM's aren't doing their job, well I'll be fucking hacked off with my team mates.
 
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[QUOTE="bus-conductor, post: 2487478, member: 6078"

The alternative solution would be to use training to better teach the players about the triggers of when and where to apply pressure, turning Tottenham’s individual efforts to win the ball back into a more cohesive, mechanistic method when out of possession. History tells us that this is a big ask: Mourinho’s teams haven’t ever really been lauded for their high-pressing approach, especially not in a way that is comparable to effective high-pressing teams in the modern game.



2. An ineffective press is not just useless, it's actually harmful. The other team will just pick you off, even if in their own box. Within seconds they will have a 3 on2 somewhere in MF or further up the pitch, and you're in big trouble, again.

I remember seeing Redknapp's Spurs playing Rodgers' Swansea. They'd been promoted and were doing well in the PL with a strategy of hard pressing. Spurs won it comfortably by hard pressing them, but only when they crossed the half way line.

I liked that idea because it's simple for a team to understand. The white line on halfway is plainly visible. It's also easier on the fitness and stamina of the team. You can pretty much do that all game, every game.

Another damaging aspect of an ineffective press - it will destroy team ethos and morale. If I've pressed the keeper well in his area, but he can find a simple 10 yard square ball to a full back because the other strikers and AM's aren't doing their job, well I'll be fucking hacked off with my team mates.
[/QUOTE]

Nailed it. The loss of shape and wasted energy from an ineffective high press is utterly counterproductive. If you're not going to do it right, retreat go for a mid pitch press with a much more compact team shape.
 
Perhaps part of the problem is after having the same players and Manager for several seasons, we now have 11 players and Manager that have been with us 12 months or less. Whilst not all play at once it will still take time to get the full understanding of each others play.
 
Great writeup BC! Thoroughly impressed by your analysis.

That bolded bit above; isn't that how Joao Sacramento had the team set up at Lille? I never really watched them play when he was part of the staff, but I heard they performed well during a span by just launching the counter and playing rather conservatively. Is that the case?

I paid more attention to Lille after Bielsa came in in the summer of 2017, he didn't last long and Sacramento took over briefly as caretaker before being replaced by Galtier. Obviously Bielsa hadn't really had time to instils his ethos, but anything after that was going seem more conservative I guess. Lille were a bit of a mess 17-18 and nearly went down, but you could see they had some really decent young players, I actually tipped them to have a good season 18-19, which they duly did, even better than I imagined, finishing second (having finished 17th in 17-18).

By 18-19 Campos had put together a bunch of forwards that really clicked, playing in a 4231 mostly with Pepe/Ikone/Bamba behind Leao (eventually).

From what I can remember they played a pretty reactive style, medium block and countered well, but I might be remembering that wrong and there may well have been some variation depending on who they played, ie more reactive against the PSG's, Lyon's etc but more proactive against the munters. Top be honest, it wasn't their tactical approach that stood out, it rarely does with French teams as you rarely get maverick tactical coaching there, it's all pretty decent coaching, good practices, coherence without the ball is pretty standard, no one plays long ball etc, but you rarely get the heavy metal we see in the Bundesliga, heavy possession based ethos's of La Liga, tactical idiosyncrasies of Serie A. it was more the young group of players that was catching my eye.

I found this article - also on the Athletic - about Sacremento.


Meet Mourinho’s new No 2: a tactical genius born in Portugal, made in Wales and who has never played football

Treforest, a small town in the Welsh valleys, strikes as an unusual place for Jose Mourinho’s new No 2 to have begun his coaching education. Aside from being the birthplace to Sir Tom Jones, there is little much else to write home about.

But for Joao Sacramento, it represented the start to a pursuit of a career at the highest level. And he was unafraid to leave his comfort zone to take it.

As an 18-year-old, Sacramento moved from Portugal to Treforest to study at the University of Glamorgan — as it was named then — because its football course was one of only a few offering such bespoke tutoring in Europe.

He wasn’t there for the cosmopolitan lifestyle. One contemporary student tells The Athletic: “It’s literally the start of a valley. When I first moved there my mum said, ‘Where are we?’”

Sacramento’s progression from undergrad in south Wales to jobs at Monaco and Lille — where he was briefly caretaker manager aged 29 — and now Tottenham is a triumph for academia. He did not play the game to any level but instead committed fervently to understanding coaching methods and in that sense Mourinho, who has a history of making such appointments when you consider Andre Villas-Boas and Rui Faria, might see a reflection of himself.

Sacramento’s mother and father could not envisage their son’s trajectory at the start, however. “His parents wanted him to study something mainstream, like engineering,” says Dave Adams, who led the course at Glamorgan, now called the University of South Wales. “He was interested in coaching from a very young age. He found the course online and knew it offered qualifications and a degree in football that was very specialist. In Portugal there was no such programme available. His parents didn’t seem very keen. They wondered where he would go career-wise, which is fair enough, it was niche. But he and I managed to convince them.”

Even though he could speak French and Spanish, Sacramento’s English was actually very rudimentary when he first relocated. But he came armed with an excellent appreciation of the training methods Mourinho had brought to England to such success in his first stint at Chelsea.

‘Tactical periodisation’ is a concept pioneered by Vitor Frade at the University of Porto which essential interweaves all the elements of football. “Everything is integrated, all the disciplines of the game come together,” says Adams. “So when you are doing technical, tactical training you are also training the physical at the same time.”

John Terry has given an account of what this looked like for players. “We were of a generation that on day one of pre-season, you’d put your trainers on and run around the pitch. But from day one, (Mourinho) ordered us to put our boots on (to play with the ball),” Terry recently told Dubai Eye 103.8. “His fitness coach had the mindset of, ‘You never see a pianist running around a piano.’ From day one we were working with the ball.”

Adams, who is now technical director of the Welsh FA, adds: “During Joao’s Masters we did quite a bit of research, looking into how that methodology had been implemented into various clubs at the time. Brendan Rodgers was in at Swansea, for example, and he had worked with Mourinho at Chelsea.”

It was clear from the beginning Sacramento, now 30, meant business. “He was quite quiet but extremely studious,” says Adams. “Every single assignment he got 80 per cent plus. He was incredibly switched-on.”

A university friend remembers: “He is cut from a similar cloth to Mourinho to be honest, confident but a little bit brash. He’s a good dude, can be cheeky. His English improved loads second and third years.

“For Joao there was no other way. Even back then he said there were certain managers he couldn’t work with because of his training methods.”

Adams set up vocational modules for his students, with Sacramento one of a number who gained experience at Cardiff City academy, coaching various age groups.

“He was also very much into analysing the opposition,” adds Adams. “He was very keen to learn more about going to games and he was producing very high-end, detailed reports.”

Some of these even found their way to Gary Speed, who was managing Wales at the time. “He did a lot of work behind the scenes on the intermediate teams,” says Adams. “It was an internship, so when he was doing a masters degree full-time, he would do 20 hours a week work on top.”

Mourinho scouted opponents for Louis van Gaal at Barcelona, just as Villas-Boas then did for him at Chelsea. There is a pattern.

In June 2018, Sacramento gave a presentation at the inaugural Soccer Science Conference hosted at Bristol City, in which he provided insight into his approach. “He talked about the benefits of analysing a snapshot of the opposition’s shape or tactical disposition and then building your training sessions literally as a by-product,” says Adams, who also spoke at the conference. “You think it might be straight-forward but not many are doing it to that level of detail.”

The university friend describes Sacramento’s work in that regard as “mind-bending”. “There was only really one place Joao could have gone and that’s Champions League.”

Sacramento reached that level in April 2014 when he was named head of opposition analysis at Monaco by sporting director Luis Campos, working as an assistant to video manager Miguel Moita. It is believed Campos comes from Barcelos, the same town in Portugal as Sacramento, but there was nothing nepotistic about the appointment. Instead Sacramento gained a meeting with Campos and impressed him with a demonstration of his work on his laptop. Sacramento analysed Monaco’s opponents first for Claudio Ranieri then for Leonardo Jardim.

In January 2017 Lille OSC were bought by Gerard Lopez and one of his first acts was to appoint Campos as a sporting director. And one of Campos’ first acts was to bring Sacramento in from Monaco. He joined as first team assistant coach, with a special focus on video analysis. But when Marcelo Bielsa was appointed in May 2017, Sacramento was a victim of the power struggle between Campos and the new manager. In early September Bielsa sidelined Sacramento, relegating him away from first-team duties.

Bielsa only lasted 13 games, and in November 2017 he was suspended by the club. And Sacramento, still just 29 years old, led the four-man team that temporarily took over coaching duties. The players quickly warmed to Sacramento, finding him more amenable than Bielsa, with a less ideological style of play, and were impressed by his ability to take training in French, Spanish and Portuguese. “With Bielsa, training was very positional, it was very repetitive,” said defender Adama Soumaoro. “With Joao, there is more play, we touch the ball more.”

After losing his first game in charge, Sacramento then masterminded a 2-1 win away at Lyon, abandoning Bielsa’s style for a deeper defence and counter-attack game. “He gives us confidence, he talks to us a lot, he is always behind us,” said defender Kevin Malcuit. And when Christophe Galtier was appointed as the new permanent manager in December 2017, Sacramento was promoted to being his assistant. Clearly he made an impression in that role, as Galtier sarcastically congratulated Mourinho on his “classy” behaviour in his Thursday press conference, for taking his assistant without calling him.

Zinedine Zidane was impressed by Sacramento’s work and tried to get him as part of his staff at Real Madrid.

Evidently Mourinho, who counts Campos as a friend, was paying attention too. During his 11-month spell out of management Mourinho was frequently seen at Lille’s matches. Now they will be on the bench together at Tottenham, alongside another former Lille coach, Nuno Santos, and two of Mourinho’s team from United, the fitness coach Carlos Lalin and tactical analyst Giovanni Cerra.

Sacramento’s last job in Britain was working under Adams as technical demonstrator. And his former boss is pleased to see him thriving.

“He’s extremely ambitious and believes in himself 100 per cent,” says Adams. “He is not influenced by fads. He has always had this idea and stuck to that way of working. He is a very honest person, a good guy to have at the elite end of the game. I wish him the best of luck.”
 
I paid more attention to Lille after Bielsa came in in the summer of 2017, he didn't last long and Sacramento took over briefly as caretaker before being replaced by Galtier. Obviously Bielsa hadn't really had time to instils his ethos, but anything after that was going seem more conservative I guess. Lille were a bit of a mess 17-18 and nearly went down, but you could see they had some really decent young players, I actually tipped them to have a good season 18-19, which they duly did, even better than I imagined, finishing second (having finished 17th in 17-18).

By 18-19 Campos had put together a bunch of forwards that really clicked, playing in a 4231 mostly with Pepe/Ikone/Bamba behind Leao (eventually).

From what I can remember they played a pretty reactive style, medium block and countered well, but I might be remembering that wrong and there may well have been some variation depending on who they played, ie more reactive against the PSG's, Lyon's etc but more proactive against the munters. Top be honest, it wasn't their tactical approach that stood out, it rarely does with French teams as you rarely get maverick tactical coaching there, it's all pretty decent coaching, good practices, coherence without the ball is pretty standard, no one plays long ball etc, but you rarely get the heavy metal we see in the Bundesliga, heavy possession based ethos's of La Liga, tactical idiosyncrasies of Serie A. it was more the young group of players that was catching my eye.

I found this article - also on the Athletic - about Sacremento.


Meet Mourinho’s new No 2: a tactical genius born in Portugal, made in Wales and who has never played football

Treforest, a small town in the Welsh valleys, strikes as an unusual place for Jose Mourinho’s new No 2 to have begun his coaching education. Aside from being the birthplace to Sir Tom Jones, there is little much else to write home about.

But for Joao Sacramento, it represented the start to a pursuit of a career at the highest level. And he was unafraid to leave his comfort zone to take it.

As an 18-year-old, Sacramento moved from Portugal to Treforest to study at the University of Glamorgan — as it was named then — because its football course was one of only a few offering such bespoke tutoring in Europe.

He wasn’t there for the cosmopolitan lifestyle. One contemporary student tells The Athletic: “It’s literally the start of a valley. When I first moved there my mum said, ‘Where are we?’”

Sacramento’s progression from undergrad in south Wales to jobs at Monaco and Lille — where he was briefly caretaker manager aged 29 — and now Tottenham is a triumph for academia. He did not play the game to any level but instead committed fervently to understanding coaching methods and in that sense Mourinho, who has a history of making such appointments when you consider Andre Villas-Boas and Rui Faria, might see a reflection of himself.

Sacramento’s mother and father could not envisage their son’s trajectory at the start, however. “His parents wanted him to study something mainstream, like engineering,” says Dave Adams, who led the course at Glamorgan, now called the University of South Wales. “He was interested in coaching from a very young age. He found the course online and knew it offered qualifications and a degree in football that was very specialist. In Portugal there was no such programme available. His parents didn’t seem very keen. They wondered where he would go career-wise, which is fair enough, it was niche. But he and I managed to convince them.”

Even though he could speak French and Spanish, Sacramento’s English was actually very rudimentary when he first relocated. But he came armed with an excellent appreciation of the training methods Mourinho had brought to England to such success in his first stint at Chelsea.

‘Tactical periodisation’ is a concept pioneered by Vitor Frade at the University of Porto which essential interweaves all the elements of football. “Everything is integrated, all the disciplines of the game come together,” says Adams. “So when you are doing technical, tactical training you are also training the physical at the same time.”

John Terry has given an account of what this looked like for players. “We were of a generation that on day one of pre-season, you’d put your trainers on and run around the pitch. But from day one, (Mourinho) ordered us to put our boots on (to play with the ball),” Terry recently told Dubai Eye 103.8. “His fitness coach had the mindset of, ‘You never see a pianist running around a piano.’ From day one we were working with the ball.”

Adams, who is now technical director of the Welsh FA, adds: “During Joao’s Masters we did quite a bit of research, looking into how that methodology had been implemented into various clubs at the time. Brendan Rodgers was in at Swansea, for example, and he had worked with Mourinho at Chelsea.”

It was clear from the beginning Sacramento, now 30, meant business. “He was quite quiet but extremely studious,” says Adams. “Every single assignment he got 80 per cent plus. He was incredibly switched-on.”

A university friend remembers: “He is cut from a similar cloth to Mourinho to be honest, confident but a little bit brash. He’s a good dude, can be cheeky. His English improved loads second and third years.

“For Joao there was no other way. Even back then he said there were certain managers he couldn’t work with because of his training methods.”

Adams set up vocational modules for his students, with Sacramento one of a number who gained experience at Cardiff City academy, coaching various age groups.

“He was also very much into analysing the opposition,” adds Adams. “He was very keen to learn more about going to games and he was producing very high-end, detailed reports.”

Some of these even found their way to Gary Speed, who was managing Wales at the time. “He did a lot of work behind the scenes on the intermediate teams,” says Adams. “It was an internship, so when he was doing a masters degree full-time, he would do 20 hours a week work on top.”

Mourinho scouted opponents for Louis van Gaal at Barcelona, just as Villas-Boas then did for him at Chelsea. There is a pattern.

In June 2018, Sacramento gave a presentation at the inaugural Soccer Science Conference hosted at Bristol City, in which he provided insight into his approach. “He talked about the benefits of analysing a snapshot of the opposition’s shape or tactical disposition and then building your training sessions literally as a by-product,” says Adams, who also spoke at the conference. “You think it might be straight-forward but not many are doing it to that level of detail.”

The university friend describes Sacramento’s work in that regard as “mind-bending”. “There was only really one place Joao could have gone and that’s Champions League.”

Sacramento reached that level in April 2014 when he was named head of opposition analysis at Monaco by sporting director Luis Campos, working as an assistant to video manager Miguel Moita. It is believed Campos comes from Barcelos, the same town in Portugal as Sacramento, but there was nothing nepotistic about the appointment. Instead Sacramento gained a meeting with Campos and impressed him with a demonstration of his work on his laptop. Sacramento analysed Monaco’s opponents first for Claudio Ranieri then for Leonardo Jardim.

In January 2017 Lille OSC were bought by Gerard Lopez and one of his first acts was to appoint Campos as a sporting director. And one of Campos’ first acts was to bring Sacramento in from Monaco. He joined as first team assistant coach, with a special focus on video analysis. But when Marcelo Bielsa was appointed in May 2017, Sacramento was a victim of the power struggle between Campos and the new manager. In early September Bielsa sidelined Sacramento, relegating him away from first-team duties.

Bielsa only lasted 13 games, and in November 2017 he was suspended by the club. And Sacramento, still just 29 years old, led the four-man team that temporarily took over coaching duties. The players quickly warmed to Sacramento, finding him more amenable than Bielsa, with a less ideological style of play, and were impressed by his ability to take training in French, Spanish and Portuguese. “With Bielsa, training was very positional, it was very repetitive,” said defender Adama Soumaoro. “With Joao, there is more play, we touch the ball more.”

After losing his first game in charge, Sacramento then masterminded a 2-1 win away at Lyon, abandoning Bielsa’s style for a deeper defence and counter-attack game. “He gives us confidence, he talks to us a lot, he is always behind us,” said defender Kevin Malcuit. And when Christophe Galtier was appointed as the new permanent manager in December 2017, Sacramento was promoted to being his assistant. Clearly he made an impression in that role, as Galtier sarcastically congratulated Mourinho on his “classy” behaviour in his Thursday press conference, for taking his assistant without calling him.

Zinedine Zidane was impressed by Sacramento’s work and tried to get him as part of his staff at Real Madrid.

Evidently Mourinho, who counts Campos as a friend, was paying attention too. During his 11-month spell out of management Mourinho was frequently seen at Lille’s matches. Now they will be on the bench together at Tottenham, alongside another former Lille coach, Nuno Santos, and two of Mourinho’s team from United, the fitness coach Carlos Lalin and tactical analyst Giovanni Cerra.

Sacramento’s last job in Britain was working under Adams as technical demonstrator. And his former boss is pleased to see him thriving.

“He’s extremely ambitious and believes in himself 100 per cent,” says Adams. “He is not influenced by fads. He has always had this idea and stuck to that way of working. He is a very honest person, a good guy to have at the elite end of the game. I wish him the best of luck.”

Thanks for that. I remember reading that article on Joao and liked what I read. Sounds like Lille played similar to how we are currently, which will work if we can get a midfield that clicks. The attacking talent is there and the speed is there, just worry about a swiss cheese midfield.
 
So, fwiw, here's a Manchester Evening News (MEN) piece about our 6-1 demolition of manure, which claims to be based on information from "Spurs insiders".

The reporter, Samuel Luckhurst, is the MEN's lead manure correspondent, and held this role whilst Mourinho was their coach. So, there may well be an extant channel from that time. I don't claim to have any knowledge on this, and since I certainly haven't followed the MEN's coverage closely, it may also be that Mourinho got the hump with them during his tenure. The piece does feel as if it could have been based on an off the record briefing from Mourinho with the explicit purpose of underlining some of his criticisms and concerns about the manure squad he managed.

The key claim is that Aurier & Regui played high because Mourinho knew Rashford & Greenwood would not provide cover, and this would expose Wan-Bissaka and Shaw, forcing Maguire & Bailly to leave their core CB positions. Our attacking players, like Sonny & Kane, could then exploit the space in manure's box.

The other central claim is that Mourinho judged "Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed". This is particularly interesting, because Ole's core midfield is presumably Bruno Fernandes as the AM, Pogba behind him, with a DM (Matic or Fred or McTominay).

----------------------------------------
Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
Man United were humiliated 6-1 by Tottenham and part of Jose Mourinho's gameplan was to capitalise on United's lack of protection at full-back.
Tottenham exploited the defensive shortcomings of Marcus Rashford and Mason Greenwood in their 6-1 thrashing of Manchester United.
The MEN understands Tottenham full-backs Serge Aurier and Sergio Reguilon were tasked with pressing high as their counterparts Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Luke Shaw were not protected by Greenwood or Rashford.
Spurs insiders felt Aurier and Reguilon 'killed' United 'because Greenwood and Rashford don't defend' and Aurier scored Spurs's fifth early in the second-half.
Two of Tottenham's goals came down Shaw's side and Mourinho pinpointed Shaw's tendency to abandon his station as a pundit at Old Trafford in August last year.
"Chelsea moves the ball well but they don’t look for an overlap a lot," Mourinho said during the interval of United's 4-0 victory over Chelsea. "When they do, Maguire is the one that has to jump on the outside as United’s midfield players are not defending in the box.
"When Maguire has to cover for Luke Shaw - he will learn he has to do this a lot of times during the season - the space in the face of the ball, somebody has to arrive."
Tottenham staff are also believed to have correctly guessed United's starting XI - including the inclusion of Eric Bailly at the expense of Victor Lindelof. United's coaching staff were unsure whether Son Heung-min would figure for Tottenham until they discovered he had travelled to Manchester on Saturday night.
Spurs settled on a high press to disrupt United's subdued midfielders Paul Pogba and Nemanja Matic, who was substituted at half-time with United 4-1 down. Tottenham are believed to have viewed Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed.
Matic returned late to pre-season training and Pogba arrived three days later as he tested positive for COViD-19 in August. Pogba has started all three of United's Premier League matches and looked lethargic.


Exclusive: Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
 
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So, fwiw, here's a Manchester Evening News (MEN) piece about our 6-1 demolition of manure, which claims to be based on information from "Spurs insiders".

The reporter, Samuel Luckhurst, is the MEN's lead manure correspondent, and held this role whilst Mourinho was their coach. So, there may well be an extant channel from that time. I don't claim to have any knowledge on this, and since I certainly haven't followed the MEN's coverage closely, it may also be that Mourinho got the hump with them during his tenure. The piece does feel as if it could have been based on an off the record briefing from Mourinho with the explicit purpose of underlining some of his criticisms and concerns about the manure squad he managed.

The key claim is that Aurier & Regui played high because Mourinho knew Rashford & Greenwood would not provide cover, and this would expose Wan-Bissaka and Shaw, forcing Maguire & Bailly to leave their core CB positions. Our attacking players, like Sonny & Kane, could then exploit the space in manure's box.

The other central claim is that Mourinho judged "Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed". This is particularly interesting, because Ole's core midfield is presumably Bruno Fernandes as the AM, Pogba behind him, with a DM (Matic or Fred or McTominay).

----------------------------------------
Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
Man United were humiliated 6-1 by Tottenham and part of Jose Mourinho's gameplan was to capitalise on United's lack of protection at full-back.
Tottenham exploited the defensive shortcomings of Marcus Rashford and Mason Greenwood in their 6-1 thrashing of Manchester United.
The MEN understands Tottenham full-backs Serge Aurier and Sergio Reguilon were tasked with pressing high as their counterparts Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Luke Shaw were not protected by Greenwood or Rashford.
Spurs insiders felt Aurier and Reguilon 'killed' United 'because Greenwood and Rashford don't defend' and Aurier scored Spurs's fifth early in the second-half.
Two of Tottenham's goals came down Shaw's side and Mourinho pinpointed Shaw's tendency to abandon his station as a pundit at Old Trafford in August last year.
"Chelsea moves the ball well but they don’t look for an overlap a lot," Mourinho said during the interval of United's 4-0 victory over Chelsea. "When they do, Maguire is the one that has to jump on the outside as United’s midfield players are not defending in the box.
"When Maguire has to cover for Luke Shaw - he will learn he has to do this a lot of times during the season - the space in the face of the ball, somebody has to arrive."
Tottenham staff are also believed to have correctly guessed United's starting XI - including the inclusion of Eric Bailly at the expense of Victor Lindelof. United's coaching staff were unsure whether Son Heung-min would figure for Tottenham until they discovered he had travelled to Manchester on Saturday night.
Spurs settled on a high press to disrupt United's subdued midfielders Paul Pogba and Nemanja Matic, who was substituted at half-time with United 4-1 down. Tottenham are believed to have viewed Pogba's deep-lying role as a weak link that left Matic exposed.
Matic returned late to pre-season training and Pogba arrived three days later as he tested positive for COViD-19 in August. Pogba has started all three of United's Premier League matches and looked lethargic.


Exclusive: Tottenham targeted two Manchester United players in 6-1 thrashing
Check the photos in the DM piece. I'm sure we all noticed during the game how Aurier & Kane's movement created the space for Sonny.

David de Gea tears into Luke Shaw for dire defending during Spurs loss
 
I paid more attention to Lille after Bielsa came in in the summer of 2017, he didn't last long and Sacramento took over briefly as caretaker before being replaced by Galtier. Obviously Bielsa hadn't really had time to instils his ethos, but anything after that was going seem more conservative I guess. Lille were a bit of a mess 17-18 and nearly went down, but you could see they had some really decent young players, I actually tipped them to have a good season 18-19, which they duly did, even better than I imagined, finishing second (having finished 17th in 17-18).

By 18-19 Campos had put together a bunch of forwards that really clicked, playing in a 4231 mostly with Pepe/Ikone/Bamba behind Leao (eventually).

From what I can remember they played a pretty reactive style, medium block and countered well, but I might be remembering that wrong and there may well have been some variation depending on who they played, ie more reactive against the PSG's, Lyon's etc but more proactive against the munters. Top be honest, it wasn't their tactical approach that stood out, it rarely does with French teams as you rarely get maverick tactical coaching there, it's all pretty decent coaching, good practices, coherence without the ball is pretty standard, no one plays long ball etc, but you rarely get the heavy metal we see in the Bundesliga, heavy possession based ethos's of La Liga, tactical idiosyncrasies of Serie A. it was more the young group of players that was catching my eye.

I found this article - also on the Athletic - about Sacremento.


Meet Mourinho’s new No 2: a tactical genius born in Portugal, made in Wales and who has never played football

Treforest, a small town in the Welsh valleys, strikes as an unusual place for Jose Mourinho’s new No 2 to have begun his coaching education. Aside from being the birthplace to Sir Tom Jones, there is little much else to write home about.

But for Joao Sacramento, it represented the start to a pursuit of a career at the highest level. And he was unafraid to leave his comfort zone to take it.

As an 18-year-old, Sacramento moved from Portugal to Treforest to study at the University of Glamorgan — as it was named then — because its football course was one of only a few offering such bespoke tutoring in Europe.

He wasn’t there for the cosmopolitan lifestyle. One contemporary student tells The Athletic: “It’s literally the start of a valley. When I first moved there my mum said, ‘Where are we?’”

Sacramento’s progression from undergrad in south Wales to jobs at Monaco and Lille — where he was briefly caretaker manager aged 29 — and now Tottenham is a triumph for academia. He did not play the game to any level but instead committed fervently to understanding coaching methods and in that sense Mourinho, who has a history of making such appointments when you consider Andre Villas-Boas and Rui Faria, might see a reflection of himself.

Sacramento’s mother and father could not envisage their son’s trajectory at the start, however. “His parents wanted him to study something mainstream, like engineering,” says Dave Adams, who led the course at Glamorgan, now called the University of South Wales. “He was interested in coaching from a very young age. He found the course online and knew it offered qualifications and a degree in football that was very specialist. In Portugal there was no such programme available. His parents didn’t seem very keen. They wondered where he would go career-wise, which is fair enough, it was niche. But he and I managed to convince them.”

Even though he could speak French and Spanish, Sacramento’s English was actually very rudimentary when he first relocated. But he came armed with an excellent appreciation of the training methods Mourinho had brought to England to such success in his first stint at Chelsea.

‘Tactical periodisation’ is a concept pioneered by Vitor Frade at the University of Porto which essential interweaves all the elements of football. “Everything is integrated, all the disciplines of the game come together,” says Adams. “So when you are doing technical, tactical training you are also training the physical at the same time.”

John Terry has given an account of what this looked like for players. “We were of a generation that on day one of pre-season, you’d put your trainers on and run around the pitch. But from day one, (Mourinho) ordered us to put our boots on (to play with the ball),” Terry recently told Dubai Eye 103.8. “His fitness coach had the mindset of, ‘You never see a pianist running around a piano.’ From day one we were working with the ball.”

Adams, who is now technical director of the Welsh FA, adds: “During Joao’s Masters we did quite a bit of research, looking into how that methodology had been implemented into various clubs at the time. Brendan Rodgers was in at Swansea, for example, and he had worked with Mourinho at Chelsea.”

It was clear from the beginning Sacramento, now 30, meant business. “He was quite quiet but extremely studious,” says Adams. “Every single assignment he got 80 per cent plus. He was incredibly switched-on.”

A university friend remembers: “He is cut from a similar cloth to Mourinho to be honest, confident but a little bit brash. He’s a good dude, can be cheeky. His English improved loads second and third years.

“For Joao there was no other way. Even back then he said there were certain managers he couldn’t work with because of his training methods.”

Adams set up vocational modules for his students, with Sacramento one of a number who gained experience at Cardiff City academy, coaching various age groups.

“He was also very much into analysing the opposition,” adds Adams. “He was very keen to learn more about going to games and he was producing very high-end, detailed reports.”

Some of these even found their way to Gary Speed, who was managing Wales at the time. “He did a lot of work behind the scenes on the intermediate teams,” says Adams. “It was an internship, so when he was doing a masters degree full-time, he would do 20 hours a week work on top.”

Mourinho scouted opponents for Louis van Gaal at Barcelona, just as Villas-Boas then did for him at Chelsea. There is a pattern.

In June 2018, Sacramento gave a presentation at the inaugural Soccer Science Conference hosted at Bristol City, in which he provided insight into his approach. “He talked about the benefits of analysing a snapshot of the opposition’s shape or tactical disposition and then building your training sessions literally as a by-product,” says Adams, who also spoke at the conference. “You think it might be straight-forward but not many are doing it to that level of detail.”

The university friend describes Sacramento’s work in that regard as “mind-bending”. “There was only really one place Joao could have gone and that’s Champions League.”

Sacramento reached that level in April 2014 when he was named head of opposition analysis at Monaco by sporting director Luis Campos, working as an assistant to video manager Miguel Moita. It is believed Campos comes from Barcelos, the same town in Portugal as Sacramento, but there was nothing nepotistic about the appointment. Instead Sacramento gained a meeting with Campos and impressed him with a demonstration of his work on his laptop. Sacramento analysed Monaco’s opponents first for Claudio Ranieri then for Leonardo Jardim.

In January 2017 Lille OSC were bought by Gerard Lopez and one of his first acts was to appoint Campos as a sporting director. And one of Campos’ first acts was to bring Sacramento in from Monaco. He joined as first team assistant coach, with a special focus on video analysis. But when Marcelo Bielsa was appointed in May 2017, Sacramento was a victim of the power struggle between Campos and the new manager. In early September Bielsa sidelined Sacramento, relegating him away from first-team duties.

Bielsa only lasted 13 games, and in November 2017 he was suspended by the club. And Sacramento, still just 29 years old, led the four-man team that temporarily took over coaching duties. The players quickly warmed to Sacramento, finding him more amenable than Bielsa, with a less ideological style of play, and were impressed by his ability to take training in French, Spanish and Portuguese. “With Bielsa, training was very positional, it was very repetitive,” said defender Adama Soumaoro. “With Joao, there is more play, we touch the ball more.”

After losing his first game in charge, Sacramento then masterminded a 2-1 win away at Lyon, abandoning Bielsa’s style for a deeper defence and counter-attack game. “He gives us confidence, he talks to us a lot, he is always behind us,” said defender Kevin Malcuit. And when Christophe Galtier was appointed as the new permanent manager in December 2017, Sacramento was promoted to being his assistant. Clearly he made an impression in that role, as Galtier sarcastically congratulated Mourinho on his “classy” behaviour in his Thursday press conference, for taking his assistant without calling him.

Zinedine Zidane was impressed by Sacramento’s work and tried to get him as part of his staff at Real Madrid.

Evidently Mourinho, who counts Campos as a friend, was paying attention too. During his 11-month spell out of management Mourinho was frequently seen at Lille’s matches. Now they will be on the bench together at Tottenham, alongside another former Lille coach, Nuno Santos, and two of Mourinho’s team from United, the fitness coach Carlos Lalin and tactical analyst Giovanni Cerra.

Sacramento’s last job in Britain was working under Adams as technical demonstrator. And his former boss is pleased to see him thriving.

“He’s extremely ambitious and believes in himself 100 per cent,” says Adams. “He is not influenced by fads. He has always had this idea and stuck to that way of working. He is a very honest person, a good guy to have at the elite end of the game. I wish him the best of luck.”
Where's The Athletic new article exploring how we trashed Manchester United? Oh, they only write "complete pieces" about us to criticize Jose?

Hipster boys. This piece you brought here was written after just one match. Now, just 15 days later, it looks entirely outdated.
 
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Where's The Athletic new article exploring how we trashed Manchester United? Oh, they only write "complete pieces" about us to criticize Jose? I see.

Hipster boys. This piece you brought here was written after just one match. Now, just 15 days later, it looks entirely outdated.

Here you go.


Sunday was fun. But we just beat a Man Utd who had 10 men for 70 minutes, who had already been beaten 3-1 at home by Palace, and outplayed by Brighton. I think it's still a bit early to suck each other off yet.

Rather than whine, why not post something enlightening, tell us why you think it's hipster nonsense, post something that contradicts it, opinion or otherwise.
 
Here you go.


Sunday was fun. But we just beat a Man Utd who had 10 men for 70 minutes, who had already been beaten 3-1 at home by Palace, and outplayed by Brighton. I think it's still a bit early to suck each other off yet.

Rather than whine, why not post something enlightening, tell us why you think it's hipster nonsense, post something that contradicts it, opinion or otherwise.
Thanks for the article. I'm glad I was wrong here, especially because I like them - good football writers.

Now, being a 'bit too early' was exactly my point. Their article came after our season's first game. I don't disagree with the diagnostic they presented - probably even Jose agrees with it. But they tried to use one performance to make a much bigger point about our manager. Three games later and it looks like it was a bad idea - and not a very honest one from the intelectual point of view.

In relation to the Manchester United game, we were the better team even when we were giving them penalties. I agree that their individual quality could have been a problem in the second half if they weren't playing with 10 men. But we were the better team before the red card, we were winning the game and we were having the best chances - by far. Also, after Martial was sent off, we did everything right - we had merits even when playing with one more man.

Finally, as you know, it was not just the game at Old Trafford. Since the second half against Southampton we are pressing and playing much better. We scored five against them, we could have scored five against Newcastle and we scored 6 against United. There is a clear and obvious evolution.

COYS
 
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Sunday was fun. But we just beat a Man Utd who had 10 men for 70 minutes, who had already been beaten 3-1 at home by Palace, and outplayed by Brighton. I think it's still a bit early to suck each other off yet.

Rather than whine, why not post something enlightening, tell us why you think it's hipster nonsense, post something that contradicts it, opinion or otherwise.

The ten men certainly made a difference it always does, all Utd did was switch from 3/2 up front to 2/1 but that wasn't how Mourinho beat them, his tactics were very evident well before the sending off.

Utd's obvious weakness is a defence that has the mobility and positional sense of a clit seeking teenage boy, when you force them to move about they spectacularly fail ... so how did Mourinho do this?

Well there were two very distinct tactics left and right ...

On our right when Aurier pushed well forward Sissoko (remember him) dropped into the right back space with Kane or Son dropping into midfield to stop us being a man short ... Shaw didn't know if he should stay out wide with Aurier or stay narrow stopping the runs from Kane, Lamela and to nicely demonstrate this point Son for our 3rd goal ... he was all over the place for 90 minutes.

So why did this work? why didn't or couldn't Utd stop us? Well not that big a problem to solve it's because Pogba is a lazy useless twat, whilst Sissoko was comfortable dropping back to support Aurier, Pogba was utterly useless when it came to supporting Shaw every time Spurs doubled up with Lamela/Kane and Aurier wide right .... time after time it was Maguire forced to come out of the middle, and once Maguire has to move around he's fucked. That tactic was working a treat against 11 men, once Utd were down to 10 they had no chance.

It was a different approach on the left, on this flank Regulion and Son doubled up on Wan-Bissaka with Dier moving across to cover Regulion (although he's so quick he didn't need much cover) On several occasions Bissaka was faced with 2v1, and just as Maguire was dragged wide so Baily was also dragged out wide to support Bissaka, not a role he's comfortable or very good at doing. On this flank Matic was more help defensively than Pogba but his lack of pace made this an easy overload for the two Spurs players.

With our wide men dragging not only the FB's out wide but also forcing Utd's CB's to cover out wide. Huge gaps that were created in the middle were just an invitation for our front three ... an invitation gratefully accepted.

This was a very un-Mourinho approach, away at a top six rival setting up the team to attack and outscore rather than out defend the opposition ... with our squad this is the perfect approach to take, and it seems we have a smart and experienced manger who gets that ... glory, glory Tottenham football from Mourinho, who saw that coming?
 
This was a very un-Mourinho approach, away at a top six rival setting up the team to attack and outscore rather than out defend the opposition ... with our squad this is the perfect approach to take, and it seems we have a smart and experienced manger who gets that ... glory, glory Tottenham football from Mourinho, who saw that coming?
It was pure Mourinho in the sense that it was pragmatically the best way to win the game. Jose is known for being a defensive coach - and he definitely can be a defensive coach -, but what he does fundamentally is set up his teams to explore the opposition's weaknesses. If this means playing with both FB's high up the pitch, that's what he'll do.

P. S: I agree with everything else you wrote.
 

Mourinho’s first year at Spurs: How was it for Levy, the players, and the fans?

An Amazon Prime documentary series, a global pandemic, and weeks spent self-isolating in a house with his coaches.

Jose Mourinho’s first year as Tottenham Hotspur head coach has been predictably action-packed, just often in entirely unpredictable ways.

Today marks Mourinho’s first anniversary at Spurs, a year that has marked a curious, transitional phase in the club’s history. There have been some highs, there have been some lows, and overall it’s still far too early to make definitive judgments. As a TV series, it would definitely be getting a second season, but we don’t yet know if it will kick on to award-winning status or ultimately prove fairly forgettable.

The signs at the moment are promising, with Tottenham second in the Premier League, a point off top spot, as the season resumes after the final international break of 2020. And their recent improvement means it’s easier to not really think about the lows like the limp Champions League last-16 exit to RB Leipzig, that miserable Sheffield United defeat, and the 0-0 draw away to Bournemouth that must never, ever, be spoken of again.

Looking at the 12 months as a whole, only Liverpool (82) and Manchester City (68) have picked up more Premier League points than the 62 earned by Mourinho’s Spurs.

On-pitch performance is one of the areas we will evaluate here, alongside other factors such as relationships with the players, recruitment and the results of our fan survey, as voted for by you.

We won’t dwell on that extraordinary day 12 months ago when fresh from sacking the beloved Mauricio Pochettino, Mourinho’s appointment was confirmed less than 11 hours later. Instead, this is Mourinho at Tottenham, a year on.


Settling in and changing the mentality​

Mourinho is said to feel very settled at Spurs, and has a lot of affection for the club and the squad. There was inevitably a period of readjustment after more than five years of Pochettino, but the new head coach and his players now have a good understanding of what each other are about.

One of Mourinho’s main aims when he took over was to add some character and toughness that he, and many others, felt the squad was lacking. Based on recent performances, Mourinho feels Spurs are moving in the right direction in this regard: The gritty 1-0 win at Burnley, the way new signing Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg stood up for himself and his team-mates against Manchester United at Old Trafford, the digging out of a late victory at West Bromwich Albion despite a quick turnaround from playing in Bulgaria 64 hours earlier.

And as anyone who watched the Amazon Prime All Or Nothing documentary series will know, Mourinho has repeatedly preached the idea of knowing when to win ugly, of how to be, in his words, “intelligent c***s”. This is, to a large extent unquantifiable, but looking at the proportion of opposition sequences of possession ending in a Spurs foul is encouraging for those who want to see them being less compliant and committing more tactical fouls. The metric shows that this season only Southampton (11.1 per cent) have ended a higher proportion of their opposition turnovers than Tottenham (10.8 per cent). It’s a big uptick from Mourinho’s period in charge last season, when Spurs were eighth in the league at 7.8 per cent.

Mourinho is far from satisfied because he desperately wants to win a trophy, but the signs are that he is developing more of a winning mentality.

With a presentable-looking Carabao Cup quarter-final at Championship side Stoke City on the horizon in just over a month, Spurs could have a shot at winning their first bit of silverware since 2008 as early as February 28.

Relationship with the players​

Given the way Mourinho was so revered by his players at Porto, Chelsea and Inter Milan, but then reviled by some at Real Madrid, Chelsea (in his second spell) and Manchester United, this has been an area that’s been closely watched at Spurs. Some wondered if, at 57, he could still connect with young players.

Probably the biggest tick in this particular box then is how he has ultimately found common ground with Tanguy Ndombele. In June, it appeared the pair’s relationship was broken beyond repair after Mourinho had repeatedly criticised the midfielder in public. Though reports in France of a training-ground row were wide of the mark, The Athletic reported at the time that, according to well-placed observers, the two men simply did not understand one another.

Since then though, Ndombele has responded a lot better to Mourinho’s urgings and has started to show why Tottenham broke their transfer record to sign him 16 months ago. This season, sources report that Ndombele is feeling “better than ever” and, having started all of Spurs’ last five Premier League games, he is firmly in Mourinho’s thinking.

On the other end of the spectrum currently is Dele Alli, whom it is hoped will enjoy a similar renaissance. At the moment though he is roughly where Ndombele was in June. Again, there has been no specific falling-out, and Mourinho and Dele are understood to get on well, but he is not part of the coach’s immediate plans. Mourinho would have been happy for Dele to leave on loan in the just-closed transfer window, and the England midfielder was one of the players he appeared to be targeting when saying after the 1-0 loss to Royal Antwerp in late October that: “My future choices are going to be very easy”. Dele had been restored to the side for that game for his first start in a month but was then substituted at half-time.

Dele’s priority before the January window is trying to win back his place, but there were some in the squad who bristled at Mourinho’s comments after that Europa League defeat in Belgium.

Mourinho had brought in several fringe players against Royal Antwerp game and added afterwards: “Before matches, you always ask me why this player is not playing, why this player is not playing, why this player is not selected. Maybe now for a few weeks you don’t ask me that, because you have the answer.”

There was also frustration among some members of the dressing room back in December and January, when Mourinho first started criticising Ndombele.

Broadly though, the Portuguese and his methods are popular with the players. Especially after the efforts he made to keep spirits up during the spring lockdown period, and now that results have picked up. Harry Kane and Son Heung-min have made big strides under him, while Eric Dier looks rejuvenated and the likes of Moussa Sissoko and Serge Aurier have improved.

Mourinho has also made an effort with the club’s youngsters, blooding Japhet Tanganga, 21, last season and giving minutes to Oliver Skipp. Mourinho hailed Skipp as a future Spurs captain when he signed a new contract in July, and has kept in touch with the 20-year-old midfielder while he’s been impressing on loan at Norwich City this season. He would have happily held onto Skipp for this season but respected his desire to play more regularly in the Championship.

Mourinho also singled out 18-year-old left-back Dennis Cirkin for praise in one of his first press conferences, and has since integrated the youngster into the first-team group. He was harder on Troy Parrott, whom he felt had to show more focus, but that will hopefully benefit the Irish striker, who is now on a season’s loan in the Championship with Millwall.

Having been criticised during his career for not trusting youngsters enough — something he disputes — Mourinho’s record with Tottenham’s academy graduates will be closely scrutinised. Especially given the club’s pride at developing young talent.

How the team have performed​

The raw numbers are encouraging for Mourinho. He took over a team that appeared broken and exhausted down in 14th position and now has them in second.

Over the course of his year in charge, Spurs sit third in an imagined table with 62 points from 34 games (though Manchester United have 60 points having played a game fewer). Mourinho’s points per game return is a respectable 1.82 and is the equivalent of picking up 69 points over a 38-game season. That would have been enough to finish third in 2019-20 — not bad given Kane and Son have both missed decent chunks of Mourinho’s time in charge.

For a bit of context, in the 34 games before Mourinho’s appointment, Mauricio Pochettino’s Spurs picked up just 49 points — only the ninth-best in the division over that time. In Pochettino’s reign as a whole, Spurs picked up the fourth-most points at an average of 1.89 points per game — a little above what Mourinho has averaged in his first year.

Bringing in expected goals to get a sense of the underlying trends of Mourinho’s Tottenham, the numbers are reasonable overall and very encouraging of late.

Spurs have the fifth-highest xG for non-penalty goals of Premier League teams during his period in charge, which is the same spot they occupied for Pochettino’s time at the club. Although in Pochettino’s final 34 games, Spurs were down in 12th, below the likes of now-relegated Bournemouth, Burnley and Everton.

Weighing up expected goals minus expected goals against (xGA), Spurs are seventh during Mourinho’s tenure, with plus 0.22. In Pochettino’s final 34 games, Spurs sat 10th for this metric at exactly zero, while for his whole five and a half years in charge they were fifth with plus 0.36.

Looking at just this season, however, Spurs are top of the league for expected goals minus expected goals against, with 0.92. This bodes well for the rest of their 2020-21 campaign and suggests their points tally has been merited and the results are sustainable.

The below graphic illustrates this nicely, showing shows how Tottenham’s attack and defence have changed over the last three seasons, by looking at fluctuations in xG and xGA.



When the blue line is above the red line, the team are creating better chances than they’re allowing the opposition, and vice versa. So when Pochettino was sacked last November, Spurs was in terrible form. Mourinho then stabilised things, but the defence fell apart in the period before the March lockdown before improving again after the June restart.

This season, the defence is as good as it’s been under Mourinho and the attack is currently at pretty much peak-Pochettino levels.

That fluency going forward contributed to the 6-1 away thrashing of Manchester United last month which, alongside February’s 2-0 home win over Manchester City, ranks as one of the highlights of Mourinho’s 12 months in charge. The Old Trafford victory, in particular, was a real statement of intent, and as The Athletic discussed at the time signalled that a clear identity for Mourinho’s Spurs was emerging.

A side that, led by Hojbjerg in central midfield, wouldn’t let their opponents breathe, would stand up for themselves, and would include players picked only on merit not reputation.

Style of play​

The stereotyped view of Mourinho is of negative, reactive football, which was deemed to be a big departure from Pochettino’s style of front-foot, aggressive pressing.

Yet, as the defeat of Manchester United showed, Mourinho’s Spurs are also starting to become more aggressive when out of possession. Certainly more so than in their opening game of this season, a 1-0 home loss to Everton, when Mourinho complained of his side’s “lazy pressure”.

More broadly, it’s interesting delving into some of the more advanced metrics to get a sense of how differently they have played in the last year compared to when Pochettino was in charge.

Certainly, the numbers bear out that Tottenham were much more of a pressing team under Pochettino.

Starting with high turnovers, which measures possessions started in the attacking third, Spurs sit 13th when looking at Premier League matches in the period under Mourinho (Liverpool and Manchester City are the top two). With Pochettino in charge from the start of the 2014-15 season, they recorded the fifth most in the league.

Looking at PPDA — passes allowed per defensive action — Spurs under Pochettino let opponents play only 9.54, which made them the second-most aggressive team in the Premier League when out of possession (the lower the number of passes allowed, the more aggressively you are defending). Mourinho’s version, by contrast, have been the ninth-most aggressive, allowing a far higher 12.16 passes on average before making a defensive action such as a tackle or foul.

It’s a similar story with opponent progress per possession — the distance a team moves upfield on average against you each time they have the ball, measured in metres. Under Pochettino, Spurs were the joint-most effective team for this in the Premier League at 20.8m, whereas now they are down in 15th on 21.8m (the higher the number, the more progress upfield the opponent is making).

Likewise with opponents’ time per possession, which measures in seconds the average length of possession the other team are allowed. Spurs were third on 17.8 seconds in matches under Pochettino, whereas they have been 12th with 23.2 seconds during Mourinho’s reign.





Switching our focus towards the attacking side, Mourinho’s Spurs have averaged the equal 10th most possession per game, 51.3 per cent. In Pochettino’s matches, they were third with 58.8 per cent.

More revealingly on whether a side has been dominant in matches, we can look at the FldTilt metric. Short for field tilt, this measures the share of final-third passes that a team makes in all of their games. So, if my team make a total of 80 final third passes, and all of my opponents attempt just 20, my lot have a field tilt of 80 per cent. The better teams usually dominate here, showing they have more possession in the areas that matter.

Pochettino’s Spurs had a figure of 57.9 per cent (fifth-best in the Premier League over his period in charge), compared with 48.6 per cent in their year under Mourinho (11th). Though as with most of these figures, that Mourinho figure is higher when looking at just this season — up to 51.6 per cent, it is still only around mid-table for the division as a whole.

Generally, Spurs are a little bit less direct now than they were with Pochettino. Of their passes over the last year, 11.7 per cent have been long compared to 12.0 when the Argentinian was in charge. They now move up the field slightly slower, at a rate of 1.28 metres per second when attacking compared to Pochettino’s 1.47. The current side average fewer sequences with 10 or more passes in them — 11.79, compared with 12.33 under Pochettino — and also put in a lot fewer crosses than they used to with their previous gaffer at 10.12 per game, down from 13.69.

Crucially though, Spurs have rediscovered their attacking edge under Mourinho this season (as shown by the xG graphic above). He has largely built his attack around Kane and Son, and been very effective in doing so. Kane has started dropping deeper and with Son running in behind, Tottenham are the second-highest scorers in the league so far this season, averaging more than two goals a game.

The other big tactical innovation we’ve seen under Mourinho has been the use of lop-sided full-backs. No longer so necessary since Matt Doherty and Sergio Reguilon have been brought in during the last transfer window, it was a system used last season to allow the ultra-attacking right-back Serge Aurier to play almost as a winger when Tottenham were in possession. Over on the other side, more cautious left-back Ben Davies would drop into a back three. Having greater license to get forward helped Aurier perform at by far his most consistent level since joining from Paris Saint-Germain in the summer of 2017.

In general, Mourinho has worked a lot on the team’s shape since taking over and their results this season back up the idea that Spurs look a lot more organised than they did a year ago, when things were falling apart under Pochettino. Despite the late collapse against West Ham United last month, Spurs have the joint-best defence in the Premier League this season.

Recruitment and Levy dynamic​

The absolute trust that Daniel Levy has in Mourinho helped convince the chairman, typically characterised as parsimonious, to loosen the club’s purse-strings in the summer despite the ongoing pandemic. Some around the club feel Levy is even in awe of Mourinho, just as executive vice-chairman Ed Woodward was believed to be at Manchester United.

Whichever way you look at it, Levy certainly backed his head coach in the last window — bringing in seven players (albeit, two on loan deals) for combined transfer fees of around £60 million and also signing exactly the kind of recruits Mourinho was after, at problem positions he had identified. It was the squad overhaul that, for various reasons, never took place while Pochettino was at the club.

That said, talk to anyone with knowledge of how Spurs are run, and they will reiterate that Levy is still very much the man in charge. Bringing back Gareth Bale, for instance, was his decision rather than Mourinho’s, as was opting to hold onto Dele. Granted, recent arrivals Gedson Fernandes, Doherty and Carlos Vinicius are clients of Jorge Mendes — also Mourinho’s long-time representative — but the superagent is not understood to have a great deal of influence within the club.

Thus far, their summer recruitment looks very promising. Hojbjerg has been outstanding, Reguilon has slotted in well, while Bale’s return on loan after seven years at Real Madrid lifted the mood of everyone at the club. Doherty and Joe Hart have proven Premier League pedigree, Joe Rodon looks a good prospect for the future, and Vinicius is, in profile at least, what Spurs have been looking for as cover for Kane. We don’t yet know how he will perform at this elevated level.

Midfielder Fernandes has made next to no impression since arriving from Benfica in January, but as a loan deal will not prove to be an especially costly mistake.

The fans’ view​

With no fans at grounds, it’s harder than usual to gauge how a manager is being received by a club’s supporters. We are mainly forced to rely on social media, which although helpful to some degree is designed to promote extreme views, and can often be about as reliable as pre-election opinion polls.

So last week, we invited our Spurs-supporting subscribers to have their say on Mourinho’s first year and the direction they think the team are heading under him.

The results, especially given how sceptical many were when he arrived, are extremely positive. A huge 86 per cent of respondents think hiring Mourinho was the right call. Similarly, 74.2 per cent think sacking Pochettino was ultimately the correct decision. As many as 82.4 per cent of respondents believe Spurs are more likely to win a trophy now than they were under Pochettino, while 62.4 per cent think Mourinho is doing a good job, and 31.9 per cent think he’s doing a very good job.

Reflecting on Tottenham’s transfer business, 95.5 per cent rate Mourinho’s recruitment as good or very good. As for Mourinho himself, 92.5 per cent of supporters find him more likeable now than when he took the job 12 months ago.

Read the full results of our Spurs fans survey here

Public profile​

Broadening this likeability point out a touch, Mourinho has tended to be relatively reserved when speaking publicly during his year at Tottenham. There have been some outbursts, such as calling out Ndombele, but generally he has been less abrasive than he has often been portrayed. Certainly, he has been far less confrontational than those late periods at Manchester United and Chelsea when his press conferences could be excruciatingly tense.

Mourinho briefly wandered into outright self-aggrandizement territory in July, after a win away at Newcastle United (his first in the Premier League, at the eighth attempt). He boasted of Spurs’ improvement since he took over, prompting a tabloid headline of “Arrogant, selfish and quoting stats about himself — looks like the old Mourinho is back”, but on the whole he has been pretty measured.

On the occasions when Mourinho has let rip, such as in response to Manchester City’s UEFA Financial Fair Play sanctions being lifted or criticism of Kane for alleged diving, he has largely been supported by the club’s fanbase. And his endearingly off-beat Instagram posts, understood to be all his own work, have been another public relations win.


Broadly then, his debut year at Tottenham can be seen as positive for Mourinho. He has stabilised and then strengthened the squad, and there is a feeling a title challenge is a possibility over the next six months.

We should have a better idea of that after Saturday’s match at home to Manchester City. A familiar foe in Pep Guardiola awaits, suggesting that even in amongst all the changes he has overseen at Spurs, many of Mourinho’s challenges remain the same.

The last year suggests his appetite remains as strong as ever to try to overcome them.
 
NameSuccessful pressures per 90total
Ndombele7.435
Lamela7.115
Hojbjerg5.746
Winks5.315
Sissoko4.926
Son4.834
Kane3.528


Lamela21.946
Ndombele21.7102
Son19.4138
Hojbjerg16.6132
Winks1542
Sissoko14.478
Doherty13.176
Kane12.196
 
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