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Interesting piece (with small Spurs references)

theathletic.com

Damien Comolli on Toulouse and his career in England: 'I really feel now that I'm at peace'

Damien Comolli is enjoying control and success at Toulouse, the French club who recently shocked Liverpool in the Europa League
theathletic.com theathletic.com

It’s been a 31-year journey — taking in recruitment and director roles at Woolwich, Tottenham Hotspur and Liverpool — and Damien Comolli, now the president of Toulouse FC, cuts a content figure.

“I really feel now that I’m at peace,” he says.

Why? “Those years in different jobs and countries are now my toolbox that I peek inside and choose the right tool for the solution.”

He’s never felt this way before. “I can control more or less everything that is happening day to day but, even in a crisis, there’s no panic. The key is having good people around me and listening to them. Speaking is easy, listening is more difficult.”

Toulouse’s success reflects a well-run and rejuvenated club, rising from the foot of France’s second division just over three years ago to become a top-tier, French Cup-winning, Europa League outfit. “We got promoted (as 2021-22 Ligue 2 champions) and French football noticed; after the cup, European football noticed; after beating Liverpool, the world of football noticed,” says Comolli with a smile.

The 51-year-old Frenchman spent two years at Anfield as director of football strategy. The deadline-day signings of strikers Luis Suarez and Andy Carroll in January 2011 were the most eye-catching deals of his tenure.

Fast forward almost 13 years and the 3-2 group-stage win over his former side last Thursday, especially after October’s reverse fixture had ended in a 5-1 defeat, was equally surprising. Or was it? “Without sounding arrogant, we planned for it. We knew the game at Anfield was going to be hell, but we thought, ‘We can do something at home’, so we approached it differently. It was not unexpected.”

Why such confidence? “We are extremely data-driven on all our football decisions. How we recruit coaches, players; the way we attack, defend; shoot, don’t shoot; cross, press; even optimise our wage bill. Data is part of our culture.”

Along with Premier League clubs Brighton & Hove Albion and Brentford, Toulouse are the sport’s data disrupters. “Our competitive advantage is we decided to go with data and we stick with it. Even when things appear counter-intuitive to the so-called football wisdom.”

Before facing Liverpool in this season’s Europa League, Comolli met his football strategy department to debate a two-game plan, which meant no worry after that defeat on Merseyside: “We never look at the results, we look at the underlying data. For a club like us to leave Anfield with an xG (expected goals) of 1.4 showed that, even in that game, we could create.”

Only one visiting team have registered a better xG than 1.4 at Anfield in the Premier League this season — Brentford, another data-driven side, who achieved 1.68 in Sunday’s 3-0 loss.

Carles Martinez Novell — previously in academy roles in Spain, Qatar and Kuwait before being promoted from an assistant this summer after the firing of last season’s cup-winning boss Philippe Montanier — set the tone immediately after Liverpool’s four-goal triumph. “In the changing room, our head coach said, ‘It might sound crazy, but I want you to be as crazy as me in two weeks’ time. With a different mental approach, we can win it’. That’s where it all started.”

In-game, data-driven decisions helped the longer-term plan too.

“I’m in a WhatsApp group with the analyst and at 4-1 down, I checked when (forward) Thijs Dallinga was coming off. They said he was heading into the ‘red’ (physically fatigued), so it would be two minutes,” he explains. “We want players to perform at their peak and avoid overload, so he came off on 80 minutes. If he’d stayed on, maybe he would get injured.”

Dallinga scored to make it 2-0 in the return against Liverpool and a haul of three goals in his four Europa League games has seen the 23-year-old rewarded this month with a first senior call-up by the Netherlands.

The comments of manager Jurgen Klopp after Liverpool’s 100 per cent record in Europe this season bit the dust highlighted the change in Toulouse’s mental approach: “They won all the decisive battles and challenges. They fought harder. It’s deserved, so congratulations.”

Toulouse’s plan worked, and human emotion kicked in for Comolli. “Usually you feel relief, but this was pure enjoyment. The togetherness with the Violets (the club’s nickname) community was incredible.“

The buzz went further afield than the 33,000-capacity Stadium de Toulouse. “I got texts, messages and emails from all over the world — from South Africa, Ghana, Australia, the U.S., South America, everywhere. The repercussions that win had on the global stage for the city of Toulouse is tremendous.”

Comolli’s football experiences have been a learning curve.

Starting as a youth coach at Monaco in 1992 under Arsene Wenger, he joined his countryman at Woolwich four years later as a European scout. He then spent a season as technical director back in French football with Saint-Etienne (2004-05) before Daniel Levy appointed him director of football at Tottenham after the departure of Frank Arnesen. He spent three years there, until Harry Redknapp replaced Juande Ramos.

The premise was that the manager would be given greater control.

Then and now, it’s not a model Comolli agrees with.

“Definitely not. The manager is the worst person in the club to make that type of decision,” he says. “For the good of Tottenham, Daniel never listened to what Harry was saying. Otherwise, he would have destroyed the club. He didn’t want Gareth Bale, didn’t want (Luka) Modric, he didn’t want all of these players. Daniel is too strong. That was the key to Spurs’ success going forward.”

Redknapp admits he didn’t want a director of football in the organisation, and that led to Comolli’s dismissal after a conversation with Levy. He says he was keen to build his team around future Real Madrid great and Ballon d’Or winner Modric, who he regards as one of his favourite players, and always felt Welsh icon Bale, who followed the Croatian to the Bernabeu, was going to be a superstar. Redknapp says his record at Spurs speaks for itself.


Toulouse are controlled by U.S. investor RedBird Capital, which has an 85 per cent stake in the club. It also owns Italy’s AC Milan, and European football’s governing body UEFA ruled the two sides must not collaborate. (They could meet in the Europa League’s first knockout round in February, if Toulouse advance as group runners-up — they are second behind Liverpool with two games to go — and Milan finish third — their current position after four of the six matches — in their Champions League group.)

Nevertheless, Comolli, who was speaking at Web Summit in Lisbon, where he contributed to a panel session on data analytics in football alongside former Tottenham and Chelsea manager Andre Villas-Boas, is at the top of the tree at his club and that is all that matters to him.

“I’m now in a position where everyone is aligned with me at the club. I don’t need to be aligned with someone, if you see what I mean, because the buck stops with me at the end. If I, or we, decide something, then everything has got to fall into line at the club and that’s a big difference with everything that I’ve gone through before and that’s maybe why we are a success.”

He admits he was “useless” when people micromanaged him in the past and that could lead to clashes. It means now he tries not to interfere or dictate. He believes in “responsibility, empowerment and delegation” — but on one condition. “They have to be aligned with the vision we have. That’s a massive difference-maker compared to everything I’ve encountered before. It’s simple.”

It reminds him of his time on the red side of north London.

“The only time I witnessed this type of alignment, it was with David Dein (former Woolwich vice-chairman) and Arsene Wenger and all the way through Woolwich, with all the success they had when I was there. It makes a massive difference and it cannot come from a head coach or manager, it has to come from the top.”

Comolli is happy to reflect but prefers working out what is coming next. “I’m thinking about how to be better every day. I’m pushing everyone — including myself — at the club to find an edge and a competitive advantage.”

Toulouse’s recruitment policy may be data-driven but Comolli believes the numbers will also lead you to the right characters. “We want good people and data helps us assess a lot of personality traits in players and their characters. If they do a lot of stuff off the ball, make runs to open space for another player, he’s a team player. If he constantly wants the ball, he’s got the personality when the going gets tough to say, ‘Just give me the ball’, so his team-mates can rely on him.”

Likewise, he says: “The way we play offensively, if a player is selfish, it will destroy our model and our playing style.”

Toulouse are openly discriminatory when it comes to players’ ages — they want them to be 25 or below (only five members of the squad are older). When the decision — underpinned by data — is made, softer skills come in. “We spend a lot of time with the player, as much as we’re data-driven we are culture-driven as a club. We want to make sure the player’s culture fits into our culture and vice versa. Data is key but the human side is also very important.”

And data, says Comolli, still has blind spots when it comes to recruitment. “We constantly talk about how to measure the performance of a very good young player in a poor team in a non-big five league. That’s a $1billion question and we are trying to solve it.”
 
www.thetimes.co.uk

Why traditional No 10s are being deployed as No 8s

The use of creative players behind a striker is becoming rarer as they are moved to the left or right of a midfield three, but a No 10’s skill set is far from redundant
www.thetimes.co.uk www.thetimes.co.uk

Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Mesut Ozil and James Rodríguez at Real Madrid, Wesley Sneijder (Real and Inter Milan), AC Milan’s Kaká and Woolwich’s Dennis Bergkamp et al.

Yet over the past ten years or so, those creative players who sit behind a striker have become rarer — they have instead been deployed either on the left or right of a midfield three (so-called “No 8s”).

The list of former No 10s who now play in deeper roles at English clubs is extensive: at Manchester United there is Bruno Fernandes and Mason Mount; at Manchester City there is Kevin De Bruyne and previously Ilkay Gundogan; at Woolwich there is Martin Odegaard, Kai Havertz and Emile Smith Rowe; while Chelsea have Cole Palmer; Tottenham Hotspur have James Maddison; and there are several examples — Harvey Elliott, Curtis Jones, Dominik Szoboszlai and Alexis Mac Allister — at Liverpool.


Many of these were playing as No 10s in their academy days or even immediately before they joined their clubs in England — but why are they now playing as No 8s, and if the demand for players featuring as conventional No 10s for top-level teams is falling, why are so many young players still playing that position?

The answer comes in two parts: the evolution in tactics over the past 10 to 15 years; and the prized skills that No 10s inherently develop, and how they are still valuable — even if not used directly behind a striker.
Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Bergkamp, at Arsenal, was a classic example

Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Bergkamp, at Woolwich, was a classic example
GETTY IMAGES

First, the 4-2-3-1 formation — which housed Ozil and Rodríguez as No 10s — is rarer than it was a decade ago — but more importantly, the demands of players across the entire pitch has changed too.
Players are becoming more tactically aware as the quality of academy coaching improves; rather than being asked to play in one particular position, they are often challenged with fulfilling a variety of roles: sometimes defending, other times attacking, and often doing all the bits in between — all depending on where the ball and their team-mates are.

Although that development sits within a wider tactical context: when Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona achieved their Treble in 2011 they did so with three particularly distinct elements: a possession-dominant approach; a false-nine system featuring Lionel Messi; and full backs that soared up and down the pitch, providing width as the Barcelona wingers moved infield when the team held possession in the final third.
As wingers have increasingly played on the opposite side to their footedness, having a player who could offer width, an overlap, and a natural crossing option has become more valuable — and that 4-3-3 formation Barcelona used (and became a template across Europe) looked like a 2-3-5 shape in practice.
But with three attackers and two full backs positioned inside or just outside the opponents’ penalty area, the rest of the pitch needed to be defended by the midfielders and centre backs.
The specialist and fixed No 10, then, became positionally redundant as full backs took up more attacking duties and positions became more fluid.

Now, in 2024, full backs are not overlapping as often and tend to provide protection infield by inverting. But with a crowded midfield the challenge is to identify where space is and how to access it — which is where those who played as No 10s in their early careers step forward: they can find or manipulate space and operate within it, whether it is in the centre of the pitch or out wide near the touchline.
That ability to discern where space is, drag opponents around and create opportunities for team-mates, are the exact qualities No 10s develop and are renowned for, but they are now being asked to use them in deeper positions (or even as false No 9s).

But what is the value of using a No 10 in spaces that are not native to them? There are a few elements that make No 10s valuable and malleable: their movement, their ability to shield the ball and operate in tight spaces with both feet, and a sense of how to thread delicate passes or force through line-breaking ones. In short, it is their intelligence on the pitch — smart players are always useful, especially in a modern game where players must be comfortable with rotating.

In Woolwich’s Havertz and Liverpool’s Jones are two very different players who demonstrate the virtues of using No 10s in deeper positions.

Fifa’s Training Centre — an online academy established by Arsène Wenger, Fifa’s chief of global football development — outlines five different types of movement: in front; in between; in-to-out; out-to-in and in behind.

A movement in front is when a player looks to receive possession in front of the opposition’s defensive shape.

%2Fmethode%2Ftimes%2Fprod%2Fweb%2Fbin%2Fe1a48c1b-8529-4ea2-8fdf-96cf7ea70f05.gif


In between is when the player moves between two lines in the opposition’s defensive shape — eg between the strikers and midfielders.

In-to-out is when the player starts inside the shape but moves out, and and out-to-in is the opposite; here Havertz has moved into a more central position from out on the left to make more space for Gabriel Martinelli to receive the ball on the left wing.

And here Havertz does the opposite: vacating a central position to move out wide and find space to receive the ball himself.

In behind is a run beyond the last line, as seen in this goal against Brighton.
The concepts are simple but they are hard to master; yet both Havertz and Jones have shown an aptitude for all elements of movement and spatial awareness — as do most of the aforementioned No 10s.
Have a look at this position that Jones and Luis Díaz take up.

While they both occupy different spaces on the pitch, they are positioned on the same vertical line — so Díaz is inaccessible to Virgil van Dijk.

But watch how they coordinate their movement in opposite directions: Díaz pulls right, while Jones moves left.

Now they are both on different heights and widths, accessible to Van Dijk and should they receive the ball, they can find each other.

These synchronised movements can, of course, be performed by any player on the pitch but they tend to be the sort of patterns demonstrated by smart, creative players further upfield (No 10s), rather than centre backs or full backs who move infield.

Havertz was no conventional No 10 when he was at Bayer Leverkusen. He was essentially a secondary striker, tasked with supporting the centre forward and opening spaces with intelligent movement off the ball, rather than with combination play and delicate passing.

In his best season for Leverkusen (2018-19), he scored 17 league goals (including three penalties) and was a high-pressing, box-crashing forward, timing his runs into the area from deep (by hovering in the spaces between midfield and defence, a supporting player can avoid the immediate attention of the defending team and spring a surprise run).

Here’s one of those box-crashing moments, in Leverkusen’s win over Mainz.
But he also displayed a deftness of touch, a willingness to show for the ball and the capacity to receive in space.

Those qualities (combined with his size, which is particularly useful for a team that had the lowest aerial win rate in the league last season) were why Woolwich believed he could play as a No 8, operating in the midfield and forward line.

It has taken Havertz a while to get up to speed but he now has four league goals and an assist, while playing in a slightly deeper position than he did at Chelsea.

As Havertz was not a conventional No 10, when he plays as a No 8 he interprets the role slightly differently: he often positions himself relative to the striker to find space and surprise defences, like for the goal against Brighton mentioned earlier.

Just like the Tottenham full backs Pedro Porro and Destiny Udogie, who move infield but play very different roles, there are countless ways to interpret the No 8 position, and having an unorthodox skill set adds another piece of equipment to a team’s tactical toolbox, so they can disassemble defences and construct attacks.

One of those tools that No 10s instinctively hone is a passing range and an appreciation for the weight of pass.

Another attacking midfielder who has been tasked with playing deeper this season is Mac Allister; here he threads through a masterful pass between four players to set Diogo Jota through on goal.
Playing a No 10 deeper can open up all manner of possibilities; by largely doing away with the No 10 position over the past decade, the players who once fitted that mould have been liberated to influence matches even more.
 
bus-conductor said:
www.thetimes.co.uk

Why traditional No 10s are being deployed as No 8s

The use of creative players behind a striker is becoming rarer as they are moved to the left or right of a midfield three, but a No 10’s skill set is far from redundant
www.thetimes.co.uk www.thetimes.co.uk

Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Mesut Ozil and James Rodríguez at Real Madrid, Wesley Sneijder (Real and Inter Milan), AC Milan’s Kaká and Woolwich’s Dennis Bergkamp et al.

Yet over the past ten years or so, those creative players who sit behind a striker have become rarer — they have instead been deployed either on the left or right of a midfield three (so-called “No 8s”).

The list of former No 10s who now play in deeper roles at English clubs is extensive: at Manchester United there is Bruno Fernandes and Mason Mount; at Manchester City there is Kevin De Bruyne and previously Ilkay Gundogan; at Woolwich there is Martin Odegaard, Kai Havertz and Emile Smith Rowe; while Chelsea have Cole Palmer; Tottenham Hotspur have James Maddison; and there are several examples — Harvey Elliott, Curtis Jones, Dominik Szoboszlai and Alexis Mac Allister — at Liverpool.


Many of these were playing as No 10s in their academy days or even immediately before they joined their clubs in England — but why are they now playing as No 8s, and if the demand for players featuring as conventional No 10s for top-level teams is falling, why are so many young players still playing that position?

The answer comes in two parts: the evolution in tactics over the past 10 to 15 years; and the prized skills that No 10s inherently develop, and how they are still valuable — even if not used directly behind a striker.
Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Bergkamp, at Woolwich, was a classic example

Since the turn of the century, the best European teams have generally had a No 10-type player — Bergkamp, at Woolwich, was a classic example
GETTY IMAGES

First, the 4-2-3-1 formation — which housed Ozil and Rodríguez as No 10s — is rarer than it was a decade ago — but more importantly, the demands of players across the entire pitch has changed too.
Players are becoming more tactically aware as the quality of academy coaching improves; rather than being asked to play in one particular position, they are often challenged with fulfilling a variety of roles: sometimes defending, other times attacking, and often doing all the bits in between — all depending on where the ball and their team-mates are.

Although that development sits within a wider tactical context: when Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona achieved their Treble in 2011 they did so with three particularly distinct elements: a possession-dominant approach; a false-nine system featuring Lionel Messi; and full backs that soared up and down the pitch, providing width as the Barcelona wingers moved infield when the team held possession in the final third.
As wingers have increasingly played on the opposite side to their footedness, having a player who could offer width, an overlap, and a natural crossing option has become more valuable — and that 4-3-3 formation Barcelona used (and became a template across Europe) looked like a 2-3-5 shape in practice.
But with three attackers and two full backs positioned inside or just outside the opponents’ penalty area, the rest of the pitch needed to be defended by the midfielders and centre backs.
The specialist and fixed No 10, then, became positionally redundant as full backs took up more attacking duties and positions became more fluid.

Now, in 2024, full backs are not overlapping as often and tend to provide protection infield by inverting. But with a crowded midfield the challenge is to identify where space is and how to access it — which is where those who played as No 10s in their early careers step forward: they can find or manipulate space and operate within it, whether it is in the centre of the pitch or out wide near the touchline.
That ability to discern where space is, drag opponents around and create opportunities for team-mates, are the exact qualities No 10s develop and are renowned for, but they are now being asked to use them in deeper positions (or even as false No 9s).

But what is the value of using a No 10 in spaces that are not native to them? There are a few elements that make No 10s valuable and malleable: their movement, their ability to shield the ball and operate in tight spaces with both feet, and a sense of how to thread delicate passes or force through line-breaking ones. In short, it is their intelligence on the pitch — smart players are always useful, especially in a modern game where players must be comfortable with rotating.

In Woolwich’s Havertz and Liverpool’s Jones are two very different players who demonstrate the virtues of using No 10s in deeper positions.

Fifa’s Training Centre — an online academy established by Arsène Wenger, Fifa’s chief of global football development — outlines five different types of movement: in front; in between; in-to-out; out-to-in and in behind.

A movement in front is when a player looks to receive possession in front of the opposition’s defensive shape.

%2Fmethode%2Ftimes%2Fprod%2Fweb%2Fbin%2Fe1a48c1b-8529-4ea2-8fdf-96cf7ea70f05.gif


In between is when the player moves between two lines in the opposition’s defensive shape — eg between the strikers and midfielders.

In-to-out is when the player starts inside the shape but moves out, and and out-to-in is the opposite; here Havertz has moved into a more central position from out on the left to make more space for Gabriel Martinelli to receive the ball on the left wing.

And here Havertz does the opposite: vacating a central position to move out wide and find space to receive the ball himself.

In behind is a run beyond the last line, as seen in this goal against Brighton.
The concepts are simple but they are hard to master; yet both Havertz and Jones have shown an aptitude for all elements of movement and spatial awareness — as do most of the aforementioned No 10s.
Have a look at this position that Jones and Luis Díaz take up.

While they both occupy different spaces on the pitch, they are positioned on the same vertical line — so Díaz is inaccessible to Virgil van Dijk.

But watch how they coordinate their movement in opposite directions: Díaz pulls right, while Jones moves left.

Now they are both on different heights and widths, accessible to Van Dijk and should they receive the ball, they can find each other.

These synchronised movements can, of course, be performed by any player on the pitch but they tend to be the sort of patterns demonstrated by smart, creative players further upfield (No 10s), rather than centre backs or full backs who move infield.

Havertz was no conventional No 10 when he was at Bayer Leverkusen. He was essentially a secondary striker, tasked with supporting the centre forward and opening spaces with intelligent movement off the ball, rather than with combination play and delicate passing.

In his best season for Leverkusen (2018-19), he scored 17 league goals (including three penalties) and was a high-pressing, box-crashing forward, timing his runs into the area from deep (by hovering in the spaces between midfield and defence, a supporting player can avoid the immediate attention of the defending team and spring a surprise run).

Here’s one of those box-crashing moments, in Leverkusen’s win over Mainz.
But he also displayed a deftness of touch, a willingness to show for the ball and the capacity to receive in space.

Those qualities (combined with his size, which is particularly useful for a team that had the lowest aerial win rate in the league last season) were why Woolwich believed he could play as a No 8, operating in the midfield and forward line.

It has taken Havertz a while to get up to speed but he now has four league goals and an assist, while playing in a slightly deeper position than he did at Chelsea.

As Havertz was not a conventional No 10, when he plays as a No 8 he interprets the role slightly differently: he often positions himself relative to the striker to find space and surprise defences, like for the goal against Brighton mentioned earlier.

Just like the Tottenham full backs Pedro Porro and Destiny Udogie, who move infield but play very different roles, there are countless ways to interpret the No 8 position, and having an unorthodox skill set adds another piece of equipment to a team’s tactical toolbox, so they can disassemble defences and construct attacks.

One of those tools that No 10s instinctively hone is a passing range and an appreciation for the weight of pass.

Another attacking midfielder who has been tasked with playing deeper this season is Mac Allister; here he threads through a masterful pass between four players to set Diogo Jota through on goal.
Playing a No 10 deeper can open up all manner of possibilities; by largely doing away with the No 10 position over the past decade, the players who once fitted that mould have been liberated to influence matches even more.
Click to expand...

Shame when Maddison did play for England they stuck him up Kane’s bum rather than played him in his current modern Spurs role.

Having the number 10 as part of midfield is something I like. A lot of midfield’s now have the deep lying playmaker (6), the forward playmaker (10) and the box to box (8) as standard. We are quite good for that when all our players are fit with some players able to cover multiple positions.

Might need a bit more depth at 6 such as Vermeeren and upgrade to Hojbjerg and Skipp.

6

Bissouma
Bentancur

8

Bentancur
Sarr
Lo Celso
Skipp
Hojbjerg

10

Lo Celso
Maddison
Kulusevski

I do find it interesting the article referenced Havertz and while he is a goal scorer he isn’t the best if you want fluid creative passing, at best he is a number 10 second striker.

I suppose you could say the number 10 originally was a second striker with the old fashioned little and big man combination (Defoe and Crouch), then it evolved into a more creator role behind the striker and now it has evolved into a creator midfield type role.

In this respect Maddison feels like the modern number 10 where as Havertz is closer to the old fashioned second striker role, perhaps why it doesn’t seem to work that well.
 
Bit light on detail and real in depth analysis, but worth a read maybe. Talking about Woolwich's hybrid press system where they switch from Man to Man to zonal. It's not revolutionary, various other coaches have used variations of the man to man and/or hybrid system. But it does take coaching, energy and athleticism, and some tactical nous.

The pattern of Arse/Liverpool was similar in some way to Arse v us. Early aggressive energetic press, but once you break it a couple of times, and energy levels start to wain, it can turn lazy or into pure zonal.

This is where the athleticism, combined with technical ability and bravery of Bissouma is so vital. Like many teams, even the best ones, we/he struggled early with that energetic press. But he didn't disappear up his own arse, he kept trying to play and beat the press and gradually we got a foothold in the game.

Woolwich average 60% possession. They had 46% against us.




https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-Woolwich-beat-liverpool-using-hybrid-pressing-nqhjpspvl



“Hybrid-pressing” was how Jamie Carragher described the tactics Woolwich used in their 3-1 win over Liverpool on Sunday — tactics that neutered Jürgen Klopp’s team and reduced them to season-low statistics for shots on target (one) and expected goals (0.3).

But what is “hybrid-pressing”, and how can a team beat it?

Simply, it is a combination of both zonal pressing (the conventional style of defending) and man-marking.

Zonal marking is the conventional style of defending: it prioritises covering certain areas, typically the centre of the pitch. But that means there are spaces where opponents can hold possession freely, without pressure — often in deeper areas or out wide.

This 4-4-2 shape taken up by Woolwich below is an example of zonal defending — they sit off and are primed to spring out and apply pressure if Liverpool venture too far forward.


Zonal pressing is fundamentally reactive; when an opponent enters a zone the press is triggered. But man-to-man pressing is proactive.
In its simplest form, man-to-man pressing means that the players of the team without possession are assigned an opponent to track around the pitch. It is the style commonly associated with Marcelo Bielsa and his Leeds United side, but can actually be traced back to Herbert Chapman and his Woolwich team.
“The advantages of rigid man-marking are also clear: simplicity, no communication problems when passing and moving, no special tactical training, playing off an ideally superior athleticism, and a continuous focus on the opposition’s key player,” writes Rene Maric, the head of coaching and playing style at Bayern Munich, for the German tactical website Spielverlagerung.
There are a couple of ways to man-mark: players can follow their opponents around the pitch, or they can man-mark and pass them on to their team-mate (e.g. a central midfielder may wish to pass the player they are marking to a winger or full back if they are pulled out wide).
While in recent years some sides have used a specialist man-marker within a zonal system (Sir Alex Ferguson would often task Park Ji-sung with sticking to particularly dangerous opponents, notably Andrea Pirlo), the man-marking tactic requires almost every outfield player to commit, so the defending team can regain the ball high up the pitch.
One of the key principles of a man-marking press is to “split the pitch” in half, to limit the space available to the team with possession.
Arsenal funnel the ball to one side and split the pitch, so Liverpool are trapped on their left wing. Arsenal eventually win possession as Virgil van Dijk is unable to find a team-mate

Woolwich funnel the ball to one side and split the pitch, so Liverpool are trapped on their left wing. Woolwich eventually win possession as Virgil van Dijk is unable to find a team-mate
Most coaches tend not to use all ten outfield players when pressing in a man-marking system, though, and leave a covering player at the back. If the opponent has one striker, the pressing team usually leaves two defenders at the back so one can man-mark and the other can sweep.
The trade-off for having a covering defender is that the pressing team’s striker often has to try to press two centre backs, which is why it is important to split the pitch and prevent both centre halves from getting on the ball.
Consequently, the team with possession will usually have a “free man”, but the pressing team will try to make sure this player is one whom they are content with holding the ball freely — typically a centre back with a limited passing range.
One of the downsides of man-marking is that it can be manipulated by smart movement. For example, Liverpool’s Alexis Mac Allister found space early in the first half against Woolwich and was able to play a forward pass to Cody Gakpo, after both Ryan Gravenberch and Diogo Jota had dragged Oleksandr Zinchenko and Jorginho away to create a passing lane for the Argentina international.
Gravenberch and Jota’s runs create space for Mac Allister to find Gakpo, as Arsenal’s forwards are committed to presing man-to-man, but the rest of the team are caught between pressing or dropping off into their zonal marking system

Gravenberch and Jota’s runs create space for Mac Allister to find Gakpo, as Woolwich’s forwards are committed to presing man-to-man, but the rest of the team are caught between pressing or dropping off into their zonal marking system
But Woolwich’s pressing system flitted between approaches: when they pressed high they did so man-to-man; but once Liverpool advanced with the ball near halfway they would drop off into a zonal shape, which made manipulating space, as Liverpool did above, harder.
In this illustration below, Martin Odegaard joins Kai Havertz in leading the press, while the wingers Bukayo Saka and Gabriel Martinelli support by closing down the Liverpool full backs.
Arsenal apply pressure in the opening minutes of the match by pressing aggressively, man-to-man

Woolwich apply pressure in the opening minutes of the match by pressing aggressively, man-to-man
Behind them, Jorginho and Declan Rice stepped up to cover Curtis Jones and Mac Allister, while Gabriel tended to press the away side’s third midfielder, Gravenberch. This left the remaining defenders — Ben White, William Saliba and Zinchenko — one-on-one with the Liverpool front line.
The hybrid press is a tactic Woolwich have used before, for example in the FA Cup in February 2023, when they played Manchester City:
However, as many teams avoid playing out against Woolwich, it is not something spectators witness often.
But what tactics can a team or manager employ to beat a sophisticated hybrid press such as Woolwich’s? Here are a few potential solutions:

Long-ball football​

The simplest and most effective tactic is direct, long football.
A pressing team needs to be compact and keep the distances between the furthest player forward and the deepest defender as small as possible, otherwise an opponent can play through the press and expose the spaces between the lines and in behind the defence. That often means the defenders step up to (or even beyond) the halfway line.
But the effectiveness of direct passes over the top of defenders and into the space behind depends on whether the pressing team has a spare man in the defensive line, and how quick both they and the attacking players are.
In the FA Cup match between Woolwich and Liverpool last month, Klopp’s team used Darwin Núñez’s pace and physicality from the left wing to disrupt Woolwich’s man-to-man press at the back.

Stretching play​

That space between the deepest defenders and the most advanced attackers can be manipulated in other ways, too.
The team holding the ball can build up deep in their own half (or even their penalty area).
By enticing the pressing team forward, spaces can open up between the lines, which creates the potential for direct passes through the heart of the pitch and counterattacks.

Finding the spare man (or the weakest link)​

Man-to-man and hybrid systems usually leave a weakness somewhere, as usually at least one player does not press so they can sweep and provide cover.
Andoni Iraola’s Bournemouth, by comparison, leave a spare man on the opposite wing to which they are pressing. For example, if pressing the opponent’s left back on that side, they will leave the right back free. If the switch is completed, then Bournemouth drop off. For the team with the ball, finding that player with a quick switch of play can provide an opportunity to counterattack before they drop back into shape.
But Woolwich, who went three v three in defence against Liverpool, committed completely to playing man-to-man, so the potential weaknesses lay in exploiting that match-up at the back, or isolating a player who is weak in one-on-one duels.

Keep committing more players in deeper areas​

The team that has possession should — theoretically — always have the advantage of a spare player in their goalkeeper.
So even if the pressing team goes man-to-man with outfielders, the team with the ball will always have an additional man that can be found.
With that extra player is an opportunity to play around or through the press.
This idea can be taken to extremes: the team with possession could bring nine outfielders into their defensive third and dare the opponent to defend one-on-one at the back.

Take on the pressing player​

One of the biggest disadvantages of the man-to-man press is that if one of the pressing players is dribbled past, the defending team becomes imbalanced: a defending player will have to step away from the player they are marking to put pressure on the ball.
This is why teams that press man-to-man tend to keep an extra defender at the back as a spare man, but a deft dribbler can dismantle this system, as it is based upon winning one-on-one duels.
The type of players and their characteristics also have an important role in the effectiveness of a man-to-man press. Having stronger and quicker players is crucial to a man-marking press, too: a player that can outmuscle their opponent or ride challenges (such as the Italy midfielder Marco Verratti) can dismantle a man-to-man press and turn a moment of danger into one of opportunity.
Players who can consistently win their duels offer a significant advantage. For example, Erling Haaland and Kevin De Bruyne consistently won their duels against their man-markers in Manchester City’s 4-1 win over Woolwich in the Premier League last season.
In this example below, Haaland dominates Rob Holding and passes to De Bruyne, who breaks between two players before scoring.
This was a problem Bielsa’s Leeds faced: while they were largely technically and physically superior across the pitch in the Championship, when his team encountered Premier League-level opponents the advantage of his tactics became a disadvantage, as his players often lost their duels.

Capitalising on the transition between systems​

Jon Mackenzie, the analyst and presenter of Tifo Football, wrote earlier this season that one area where the hybrid press can be exposed is when the pressing team is caught between minds of whether to commit to playing man-to-man or dropping into a more secure zonal shape.
In the example used earlier, where Mac Allister passes to Gakpo, Woolwich’s forwards — Odegaard and Havertz — wished to press man-to-man.
However, as Odegaard runs past Mac Allister, his team-mate Jorginho has not “jumped” up to press the Liverpool midfielder, preferring instead to maintain his position.
The Woolwich midfielders and defenders then decide to drop as Mac Allister advances, as the Liverpool midfielder can pick a pass forward, which he does to find Gakpo.
That decisive moment of whether to jump forward or drop back requires coordination among the pressing team, and when they are positioned near halfway (or an opponent is running in behind), that question of whether to press in unison or drop needs to be answered both immediately and in complete synchrony, otherwise the press can be exposed.

Give up possession​

Arguably the most effective tactic against pressing teams is to completely eschew the opportunity for them to press at all. Sit deep, clear the ball regularly and challenge the opponent to try to create chances without preying on mistakes.
So, what is next for marking and pressing?
One idea floated by Maric is to flip the idea of a specialist man-marker — such as Park — and instead use a specialist “space marker”, who is tasked with covering space.
Those spaces would tend to be ones in the middle of the pitch that could potentially develop into danger areas if opponents could to play into it.
It’s a radical idea, but so was man-marking: “If you mark man-to-man, you’re sending out eleven donkeys,” Ernst Happel, the two-times European Cup-winning manager, once said.
So it might not be long before the space defenders make an appearance.
 
GGTH said:
Cause it's replying to it, I'm assuming as part of a thread.
I'm surprised that Bissouma is higher than Maddison.
Click to expand...

Yeah part of a long thread with each team.


Possibly reflects that as the deepest midfielder he has more slightly more “line” in front of him, but still impressive and clear to see why both have been a huge miss.

Biggest surprise for me was Hojbjerg being above both, but this is the strongest part of his game. It’s just a shame that he lacks the pressure resistance, mobility and athleticism of Bissouma to go with it.
 
bus-conductor said:
Yeah part of a long thread with each team.


Possibly reflects that as the deepest midfielder he has more slightly more “line” in front of him, but still impressive and clear to see why both have been a huge miss.

Biggest surprise for me was Hojbjerg being above both, but this is the strongest part of his game. It’s just a shame that he lacks the pressure resistance, mobility and athleticism of Bissouma to go with it.
Click to expand...
Yeah Hojbjerg has been one of the most progressive passers in the league this season. He's always had it in his locker, but under previous managers progressive passing was discouraged.
 
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